The EU in the South Caucasus, D. Lynch

CONFERENCE

Abkhazia in the Context of Contemporary International Relations
Pitsunda, The Republic of Abkhazia: June 29 - July 1, 2004

The EU in the South Caucasus

Dr. Dov Lynch

Abkhazia in Contemporary International Relations

Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Abkhazia, Abkhaz State University and the Center for Humanitarian

European Union Institute for Security Studies

First Notes

Thank you for the invitation to speak here in today. It is a pleasure to speak before such an audience on such an important and interesting question. The EU ISS was created in 2001 and launched in 2002 as an EU agency designed to provide research and policy expertise for the High Representative on CFSP, and for the main security decision-making body, the Political and Security Committee - although a full EU agency, I speak today not as an official voice of the EU but only as an autonomous voice inside the EU Council machinery.

I would like today to paint a picture of the wider context surrounding Abkhazia by outlining the evolution of EU thinking on a role in the South Caucasus and expose the debates inside the EU and with member states.

One should note from the outset that EU policy is not the result of calculated decisions taken by clear policy-making processes. Much is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the region, functional to the member state holding the presidency, the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery.

The paper is divided into four parts - a first part will outline the strategic trends increasing EU attention to the South Caucasus; a second part will examine factors conditioning EU thinking on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia; the third part will outline the debates that have occurred on a reinforced political profile. We will finish with an exploration of recent developments in EU policy. The focus falls on the three recognised states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the EU's main interlocutors in the region.

Strategic Trends

The EU is in the throes of a revolution - in fact, two revolutions. The first consists of the greatest enlargement the Union has ever experienced. The impact of enlargement on the internal dynamics of the Union will be fundamental. The second revolution consists of the constitution of a new Union.

These will affect the Union's external policies. There are four strategic factors at play:

(1) The EU will have member states with new interests. Lithuania and Latvia
have been active in developing military ties with the three South
Caucasian states. The new member states will bring new urgency.

(2) The enlarged EU will have new borders on Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia,
and after 2007 on the Black Sea. These also bring a new immediacy to EU
thinking about its periphery.

(3) The EU has started to rethink policy to states on its new borders. For
much for the 1990s, EU 'foreign policy' revolved around the question of
membership/non-membership: if membership was on the cards, then the
EU had a full policy that given state; if it was not, the EU had little policy
at all. This is changing. The new European Neighbourhood Policy reflects an

attempt to develop policies to states where the EU has significant interest but where membership is not in perspective. This process is seeing the birth of the EU as a fuller foreign policy actor.

(4) For all the clarion calls, the EU has emerged as a security actor. In 2003, the EU launched three missions, with tasks from law enforcement to security and humanitarian crisis management. The Iraqi crisis stimulated thinking on a Security Strategy. One point in the Strategy is the need for a belt of well-governed countries around the EU. The EU is developing a strategic view of its borders, which will impact on its policies to the South Caucasus. For all of its difficulties - the list is long - EU security policy is not dead.

Until 2003, the EU had a low security profile in the South Caucasus. This is set to change.

Conditioning Factors

EU thinking on the South Caucasus has been affected by a number of factors.

External Factors

(1) The South Caucasus is crowded. This complicates thinking about a
reinforced political role by - apparently at least - leaving little room for
the Union to claim as its own. The UN and the OSCE have become
experienced mediators. The activities of Russia and the U.S muddle rather
than clarify the strategic shape of the region. The South Caucasus is busy
and confusing.

(2) Second is the complexity of the region's problems, which are deep and

pernicious. International organisations and European states have sought for a decade to assuage these problems. Progress has come by drips. In such circumstances, what value may the EU add?

Internal Factors

(1) The South Caucasus is caught in a proximity/distance paradox. The
region is close enough that the EU has been forced to consider its interests
in promoting stability. At the same time, the region is distant enough that
threats from the region are not seen as immediate.

(2) The region did not have a lobbyist in the EU to catalyse greater interest.

(3) A number of EU member states have developed definite, even special,
positions in the region. Coordination - communication even from member
states to Brussels - has been poor.

(4) Finally, the South Caucasus was never a region in itself for the EU. EU
objectives were determined for whole former Soviet Union - states with
different geographies, political and economic systems and prospects.
Differentiation in thinking about the former Soviet Union has been slow
in coming.

EU Thinking and Debates

EU thinking towards the South Caucasus has featured a series of debates. Participants have ranged from member states, the Commission, EU heads of mission in the region, the European Parliament, the Council Secretariat, and the Policy Planning Unit.

The debate has circled around several questions:

1) How can the EU advance conflict settlement - a condition on
which the effectiveness of EU assistance is seen to depend?
Through participation of the negotiating mechanisms? Or support
to these?

2) How can the EU balance a focus on states with the desire to foster
regional cooperation? What is this most appropriate framework
for advancing EU aims? Through bilateral/regional frameworks?

Since 1999, EU security activities did pick up in the South Caucasus:

1) Reinforced political dialogue with the three states;

2) Support to the OSCE in South Ossetia;

3) Some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian
occupation and a declared readiness to support rehabilitation;

4) Support to the Georgian border guards and assistance to the OSCE;

5) Support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex in Georgia.

In all, however, the EU had a low profile, with little presence in the negotiating mechanisms, no involvement in mediation, and an undefined overall strategy.

Recent Trends

Since 2003, EU policy has become more defined to the South Caucasus.

First, on July 7, 2003, Heikki Talvitie was appointed as the EU Special Representative with a mandate to develop a strategy to advance stability and security. His mandate is to: 'develop contacts with governments, parliaments, judiciary and civil society, encourage the three countries to co-operate on

themes of common interest such as security threats, the fight against terrorism and organised crime and prepare the return to peace including though recommendations for action related to civil society and rehabilitation of territories. He will also assist in conflict resolution, through support to the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Georgia, the Group of Friends of the UNSG for Georgia, the OSCE Minsk Group, and the conflict resolution mechanism for South Ossetia/

The EUSR has visited the region on numerous occasions, developed excellent contacts with many local and international actors, including a visit to Abkhazia in March. Ideas have been put forward to support the work of the UN in Georgia-Abkhaz conflict through targeted rehabilitation programmes.

Second, the South Caucasus has been invited to join the European Neighbourhood Policy. If they are ready for it, this means that Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan may be offered to develop with the EU joint Action Plans for adopting the EU model for politics and economics, with substantial EU support. No offer of membership but a promise of greater EU engagement and step towards Europe. Involve also a greater EU security/political role.

Third, the EU launched a Rule of Law Mission (EUROL) to Georgia within the context of ESDP, to deploy highly experienced personnel in various ministries at a senior level to provide guidance and coordinate international support, especially in criminal and justice reform.

Finally, the EU has started to play a more active political role in the region -through the EUSR - in seeking to ensure the peaceful development of events, in the crisis between Tbilisi and Ajara and with South Ossetia. The EU can play an important restraining influence on events in Georgian politics.

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