

and to leave the Turkish side of the Danube uninvaded and secure.

In weighing the possibilities of the coming war—if war there should be—between Russia and Turkey, we are to remember that the Sultan has not a very large Army and thoroughly equipped. When the armistice was declared, the whole Turkish forces under arms amounted in actual numbers to some 300,000 men, with 666 Krupp guns, and 18,000 cavalry. The full number which can be called out, when the enrollment is complete, is 700,000 men, with 872 guns, and, in addition, some 70,000 "Zaptick," or veterans, and 20,000 Circassian cavalry, the best light-armed marauding cavalry in the world.

The heavy Russian cavalry, it should be borne in mind, are almost useless in the muddy plains of the Danube and the wild passes of the Balkans. The Turkish infantry are, to a large degree, armed with improved guns. Then, all the fortified places, whose importance has so often been tested in previous wars, are put in better condition. The Danube itself makes a formidable line of defense; then behind it, come places like Silistria, Shumla, Varna, and others. Shumla is a vast fortified camp. Varna must be taken before any army would venture to cross the Balkans and march on Adrianople. It would continually threaten the flank and rear of the invading forces. But Varna is on the sea, and any power holding the sea could make it impregnable. The passes of the Balkans, though not more than from 4,000 to 6,000 feet high, are yet easily capable of obstinate defense, and would be exceedingly difficult to occupy, unless the invading army had a fleet to defend its flank and furnish supplies. The Turks would no doubt contest these mountains with the utmost tenacity, and they would form a second and powerful line of defense. It is at least 500 miles from the Danube to Constantinople, and the Russians have probably no fleet in the Black Sea to support their invading columns. It will be seen that the taking of Constantinople, even were Turkey without allies, would be a difficult task, and with England for supporter, would be impossible. Then, all recent history shows that the Russian management of campaigns is exceedingly blundering, so that the war would probably be protracted by the mistakes of the more powerful combatant. A Russo-Turkish war will certainly not be a short one.

DIFFICULTIES OF A RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

By a recent cable dispatch, Gen. VON MOLTKE is reported as predicting a long and severe campaign in case the differences between Russia and Turkey were not adjusted by the conference and ended in war. VON MOLTKE, besides being the highest strategical authority in Europe, served himself, before his first promotion, as Prussian Colonel in one of the Russo-Turkish wars, and has written a book upon it. Whether he has publicly expressed this opinion or not, all past experience of the wars on the Danube will confirm its correctness. In the war of 1828-9, which ended in the peace of Adrianople, the Russian Army was nearly eight months in advancing from the Pruth to the Balkans, which mountains, indeed, they did not fairly reach in that year. The Turks were in miserable plight for defense, and possessed then none of the modern armament, and had not then adopted the modern European organization. Their fortified places were poorly strengthened and defended, and they had no important depots of provisions. Yet, by their remarkable tenacity of defense in the fortified posts, they delayed each step of the Russian advance, and had their genius for attack been equal to that for defense, they could have utterly cut to pieces the Muscovite Army on the right bank of the Danube. As it was, the Russians met with terrific losses both by battle and disease, in the first year of the campaign, and only reached the district a little beyond the Danube. They had then, also, vessels of war to support the flank of their march over the Balkans and along the sea to Adrianople and Constantinople. As to those mountains, the Turks, at that period, did not seem to fully appreciate their importance, and the passes were not well-fortified. The great defenses relied upon were the fortified posts at the front of them, Shumla, in the interior, and Varna, on the sea.

It should, however, be said for the Russians in that campaign that, owing to a dread of alarming Europe, they entered the contest with a very inadequate army, and fearing for the safety of Poland, left large forces in that disturbed country, and broke up their invading army by uselessly occupying the Principalities. Many stupid blunders, too, were made in their conduct of the campaign, yet in that respect they were not unlike their opponents. Among other deficiencies, they were entirely lacking in an efficient light cavalry. Though the Turks were finally beaten, and made a peace very disastrous to themselves, yet it is believed by good authorities that had the Sultan held out a little longer, the necessities of Russia would have compelled her to make a peace very different in its results to both countries. Without considering other wars, many of our readers will remember the obstinate defense by the Turks under English officers, of Silistria and other fortified places on the Danube and in Asia, in the war of 1854-6. In that struggle the tenacity of the Ottomans fairly compelled the Russians to retreat, with heavy losses,