The geopolitical potential of Abkhazia, and prospects for security in the Caucasus, L. Taniya

CONFERENCE

Abkhazia in the Context of Contemporary International Relations
Pitsunda, The Republic of Abkhazia: June 29 - July 1, 2004

The geopolitical potential of Abkhazia, and prospects for security in the Caucasus

Leila Taniya
Director of Research Programmes for the Foundation for Civil Initiatives, and reader at Abkhaz State University

Abkhazia’s uniqueness amongst the regions of the Caucasus probably results from the ongoing redistribution of spheres of influence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has turned out to be a focal point for various geo-strategic systems of security to intersect – particularly the CIS, NATO, an expanding Europe, the Black Sea area, the Caucasus, the Southern Caucasus, and the Greater Middle East. This position brings with it significant risks for the survival of Abkhazia as a de-facto independent state, but also recognises the untapped geopolitical potential of Abkhazia. Despite its unrecognised status, this could become a key element of stability and consensus not only on a sub-regional, but also inter-regional and global levels.

The lack of any visible progress in conflict resolution in the Caucasus requires analysis of why the methods of resolution applied until now have not been effective. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz peace settlement, the result of ten years of official and unofficial peace processes, the situation has become worse since the very beginning of the 1994 talks and in the mid-90s[1], with the demarcation of the official Abkhaz and Georgian positions, periodical military action and further alienation of communities geographically bordering each other.

Peace processes in the Caucasus have almost always derived from traditional ideas of conflict resolution, where most conflicts can be solved through negotiation, aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable compromise. Current Western and Russian research into the failures of the peace-building processes of the 90s has begun to develop alternative frameworks that incorporate theories of conflict with practical solutions. This has led to different ways of conceptualising conflicts: conflicts of interest, and conflicts of values (or identity). Recent war studies suggest that conflicts of identity result from deprivation of profound and fundamental needs, and require different methods of resolution from conflicts of interest that entail the pragmatic objectives of the dispute – for example, power or access to resources etc.[2]

According to the Theory of Human Need, these conflicts are solved only by fully satisfying basic needs. Compromise is practically impossible[3]. It is in such fundamental needs as security and identity that Abkhazians found themselves victimised throughout the whole Soviet period of national autonomy within Georgia. From the Abkhazian point of view, independence is ‘a question of life and death’ for their national identity, whilst from the Georgian point of view their standpoint of ‘territorial integrity’ is based on ambitions for expanding living space, and acquiring political domination - in short, improving quality of life. Because of this, Abkhazians believe that their case for ‘independence’, based on the fundamental human need for security and identity, outweighs the Georgian case for ‘territorial integrity’, which, as a primarily political-economic consideration, is not comparable[4]. Demands for a political compromise on the question of national status is, in the opinion of the Abkhazians, equivalent to demanding national suicide, as in the present demographic context, this threatens the very existence of Abkhaz identity.

The current Georgian-Abkhaz settlement depends entirely on the theoretical possibility of the Abkhazians coming to a compromise which still disregards their interests.

Not one of the suggestions made until now on the settlement have envisaged any solid guarantees of security, or the development of Abkhazian national identity. The stakes placed on the table clearly did not correspond to Abkhazia’s interests in any of the negotiations. As already noted, the Abkhazians are engaged with more profound challenges to their very existence and identity, not to mention their own political interests. Since from the point of view of the international community, as well as of the Georgians, the events of 1991-2 did not conform to international laws (it is not a secret that Abkhazians considered it genocide against the Abkhazian people), there remain reasonable fears from the Abkhaz side that this precedent could be repeated. These fears have been realised at least twice in the post-war period (the armed conflict in Gal/i in 1998, the events in Kodor/i in 2001). As Georgian writers recognise, the policies of their government towards Abkhazia ‘often place the emphasis on the use of force. It may be conceivable that this way is easier… but until Georgia becomes economically attractive, it is not in her interests to become a threat to her neighbours. And I think that for the Abkhazians the guarantee of security is more important than the economic attractiveness of Georgia’[5].

In contrast to the wholesale pessimism of current thinking about conflict resolution, and the possibilities of principled resolutions to ethnic conflicts (and especially conflicts of identity) on a long-term basis, the Theory of Human Needs presents a real opportunity for resolving conflict. It revolves around the idea of partial substitution of certain needs for others (based on interests) in a process of mutual arbitration and post-conflict negotiation[6].

By conceptualising the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and how much is staked by each side, it is possible to counterbalance the principle of mutual political compromises (which does not work in reality), with a principle of mutual compensation, based on the idea of exchanging the interests and needs of the conflict. From an Abkhaz point of view, the position of ‘territorial integrity’ is a resource to be exchanged, as in the event of this exchange nothing would threaten the fundamental needs of the Georgians on the territory of Georgia, (such as their identity or security) as it would on the territory of Abkhazia. The principle of mutual compensation would allow the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict to be resolved in the classic model of conflict resolution – by deciding which side wants the stone of the fruit, and which the flesh. This allows us to translate negotiations on to a practical level, without perpetuating the basic dilemma of the conflict – territorial integrity against the right to national self-determination.

It seems that amongst many Georgian intellectuals and officials, the practical rationality of the principle of mutual compensation has been quietly overlooked. And unofficially, this is how the Georgians have articulated the question of what price the Abkhazians are willing to pay for their independence. More recently, Prime Minister Bendukidze[7] famously distanced himself from the ideological and political undercurrents in Georgian-Abkhaz relations, when he claimed that: “Today the expulsion of Abkhazia from Georgia will be even more beneficial for our economy, than the continuing conflict, and grandiose political statements”. This also demonstrates Georgia’s clandestine pragmatism, and her priorities in this conflict as primarily economic.

From the point of view of Abkhaz economic development, opening communication through Georgia to the South is not as necessary as achieving real progress in fully and sufficiently developing the operational investment potential of Russia (which gradually is also happening in practice). However, full integration with the Southern Caucasus through Georgia (not to mention bilateral economic cooperation) is perceived with great caution and apprehension, particularly with the risks to Abkhazia’s political development and her declaration of sovereignty. In this context, the agreement of the government of Abkhazia to open rail links through Georgia is dictated primarily by the principles of conflict resolution. The same can be said about the possible opening of Sukhum airport – the best in the region according to the UN mission[8]. These examples demonstrate how the principle of mutual compensation can work on an economic level.

Additionally, it is important to critically review such basic peace-building issues as the neutrality of the mediators, which is now widely seen as lacking in common sense. Arguably, in the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, instead of rhetorical declarations about the neutrality of mediators[9], open discussion about the interests of all the participants in the negotiations, including the mediators, would be more effective, and also possible within the framework of regional consensus in the Caucasus.

A general characteristic of official negotiations in the Caucasus is their evident isolation from regional contexts, or more precisely, from the complex of regional security in the Caucasus. Although these conflicts have their own specific characteristics, it is difficult to deny their interrelationship, and their exclusion of vested interests from outside. Attempts to find a formula for bilateral compromise in any of these conflicts in the Southern Caucasus have collapsed. It is probably because of this that experts and leading politicians have suggested an alternative to implementing local negotiations: an integrated approach, directed at the search for a model of regional consensus, based on prioritising the collective interests of all players – both external powers and those of the Caucasus themselves. “The stability pact for the Caucasus”[10], a prominent document in this vein produced by Belgian academics, was never exercised, partly because it did not consider the interests of unrecognised states (which in spite of factual realities were viewed in it as members of the Former Soviet Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan). Besides, leaving Russia in the shadows would hardly have satisfied her as traditionally the leading actor in the Caucasus.

Nevertheless, the continuing search for models of integration in the Caucasus takes the anxieties, potential risks and opportunities into consideration. The most basic drawback of such models is the status of unrecognised governments and the geopolitical players within them.

Models of integration for unrecognised peoples in the region are being explored, not only with reference to their advantages for peace-building through active regional cooperation, but also to the opportunity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the basis of natural competition – economic and political. In other words, it is about competing post-Soviet states – both recognised and unrecognised - and not about war for the exploitation of external resources (economic and political sanctions, military assistance etc.). At the same time, the directly opposing motivations of the participants are also evident: within such an approach, risks taken in reciprocation by unrecognised governments, in particular, are about losing what they have been fighting for (“losing the peace”), and are practically identical with the risks of defending it. It is not surprising that Georgian experts who support integration justify the advantages of this approach by saying that “integrational processes would have begun, which would have ultimately brought about the creation of a unified state.[11]”

At the present moment, the region is dominated by processes of disintegration which reinforce mutual isolation as the consequence of sanctions (in relation to Abkhazia, Armenia, and Karabakh). Many Western experts have drawn the attention of the Caucasus participants to the fact that despite the new politics of the European fold, into which have been brought the states of the Southern Caucasus, “their mutual isolation from each other will not help them integrate into Europe, not to mention the European Union[12]”. Meanwhile, within these politics, the lack of any clearly defined strategy in relation to unrecognised states again underlines the inadequate evaluation, on the part of the international actors, of the more complex realities of regional security: The actual influence on the real situation of security in the region is absolutely equivalent for the recognised as for the unrecognised peoples of the region – they are all equally important links in the single chain of regional security.

However, the readiness of Western academic research to represent unrecognised governments has instilled a degree of optimism (although not fully) in such European-wide security organisations as the OSCE[13]. Abkhazian writers take the view that integration in the Caucasus could make use of institutional elements of the European Union and the OSCE, but even if functionally linked with these European organisations, however, this would mean a separate regional structure would have to be introduced[14].

The advantage of this approach, at least for the unrecognised states, is primarily the greater legitimacy of security guarantees, which owe their existence and mutual reinforcement to their implementation on three levels – Caucasus-wide (regional), local (bilateral), and international. Elements of the geopolitical competition of global and regional powers in the Caucasus will also obviously depend significantly on who stands in the vanguard of the process of integration in the Caucasus – Russia, the US, or the European Union.

Stabilisation of local and Caucasus-wide conflicts in this way suggests a common interrelated process. The resolution of conflicts and long-term stability could be realised by the formula of collective negotiating systems on the basis of the principle of mutual compensation - with the participation of all the participants of the Caucasus independent of their international status (including Northern and Southern Caucasus); plus the participation of international players (Russia, the US, EU, UN, OSCE); plus regional powers - aimed at finding a consensus for integration and a regional system of security[15].

Economic development perspectives in the region, particularly Western interests in developing global energy projects, demand the urgent establishment of long-term stability. However, this is hardly imaginable in a scenario of large-scale confrontation with Russia over the ultimate redistribution of spheres of influence in the Caspian- Caucasus region. With these concerns, the governments of the Caucasus have been working out their own concepts of the region, and their own specific geo-strategic and geo-economic roles in them.

In the context of forming a balance of power and stability in the Southern Caucasus, the buffer mechanisms in the region gain special significance.

As historical debate and traditional political practice demonstrate, ‘buffers’ or ‘buffer states’ can vary significantly in their functions, as becomes clear from the geopolitical phenomena discussed above. The following is most often implied:

2. A mechanism to unite conflicting and theoretically differing interests by making wide-scale military confrontation impossible and undesirable;

3. A means of finding “status quo formulae” or formulae for compromise through common interests in the buffer area;

5. A connecting link or bridge between dislocated or discordant geopolitical forces etc…

It is evident from all these aspects, that buffers generally cushion the discord and displacement of military confrontation. Historical examples known to both sides demonstrate that when implementing a balance of power, the great powers have quite often scrambled to maintain the status quo, or to support buffer states (Afghanistan), when there were no significant ambitions or military/political resources to be exchanged.

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, and the post-war re-distribution, the Caucasian players themselves, Turkey, and the European powers discussed federate and confederate unions, and even a single independent Caucasus, and also buffer states in the Caucasus. In particular, according to Russian sources: “suggesting the military-political collaboration of Germany, the Georgian government engaged the benefits of this alliance in the following way – “to the Caucasian isthmus, the idea of bordering the new Russian border with the new state formations which were formed at the Brest negotiations…”. The idea of a buffer state in the Caucasus region, acceptable to the Georgian government, suggested in this way the ousting of Russia from the Caucasian isthmus. It is by these means that in the opinion of the Georgian leaders (N. Zhordaniya et al.) the independence of Georgia can be achieved[16].”

Caucasian specialists have also recognised the resolution at this time of Turkey not to have “ever, in any way whatsoever, a common border with Russia”, resulting in Turkish diplomats striving for the creation of buffer states between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Trying to camouflage the new ambitions of Turkey, Talaat, the grand vizier of her government, aimed for the recognition, on behalf of the members of the empires of Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Bulgaria, for the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the mountain peoples of the Northern Caucasus[17].

Abkhazia and Georgia, having joined the Russian Empire independently (in 1810 and 1801 respectively), defined themselves differently after its disintegration in 1917: the former within a Union of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, the latter within a Democratic Federation of the Caucasus, which demonstrated the different cultural, political and strategic orientations of these two traditional rivals of the Caucasus. During the Georgian occupation of Abkhazia (1918-1921), General Denikin seceded to the demands of the British army for the speedy withdrawal of Georgian troops and the designation of a neutral status for Abkhazia[18].

In this way, all the states of the Caucasus in this period tried to find forms of political union and geopolitical certainties for their (buffer) status, which could provide international support for their independence from Russia or other regional powers. These plans did not come to fruition, however, because of the imminent Sovietization of the Caucasus, and its incorporation into the USSR.

The realisation of these ideas about buffer zones or states in the Caucasus is evidently connected with regional ‘insecurity’ (to coin the definition of Bzhezinskiy), and the ambition of finding guaranteed long-term methods of providing stability.

Many writers demonstrate that in several historical periods, the Caucasus has become like a transregional ‘buffer zone between competing empires’[19]. Contemporary writers also fully admit the viability of the Caucasus as a ‘regional buffer between Russia and Turkey, and also between Russia and the West.[20]’

The argument persists that the absence of buffer lines following the periodical absorption by dominant powers often becomes a reason for strained international relations, including localised and global wars[21]. In addition to this, we should appreciate the existence of weak and quasi-states within the reach of the dominant powers, which could be only because ‘it is their existence in the form of a buffer state or defined element in the system of the balance of power that establishes the dominant powers’[22]. We could suggest that in terms of stabilising factors, they can become not only international buffer zones, but also interregional buffer systems in the form of one or several buffer states.

The redistribution of power and the new geopolitical balance, which have resulted from the rivalry of the two geopolitical centres of power – Russia and the West – in the Caucasus in the last ten years, have resulted in the actual formation of the geopolitical buffer status of Abkhazia. This has happened as a result not only of natural military and political processes and relations, but also of the balance of powers in the region, primarily Russia and the USA, which has not depended on the degree of international legitimacy for the existence of a de-facto Abkhazia.

Analysis of the theory and practice of Abkhazian foreign policy does not accord with the widely spread opinion of the international community that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia, even by her own demographic and geo-economic conditions, will always remain a puppet state - a medium exclusively of Russian interests in the region - if not reincorporated into Georgia.

Little real political activity in the arena of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in any way bears out this description. In the years immediately after the conflict, not only the international community, but also Russia put unprecedented pressure on an Abkhazia devastated and made impotent by war – a pressure which, in the words of international experts, was comparable only with the sanctions placed on Serbia and Iraq[23]. Yet such a fragile state showed such unprecedented resistance to all geopolitical centres of power, including Russia.

The deterioration of relations with Russia sometimes teetered on the brink of armed conflict: such as in 1995, when a mass uncontrolled return of refugees was planned under the protection of Peacekeeping Forces, and which was included in the Helsinki Watch report on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict of 1995. In this period, there was friction even on the coastal border between Russia and Abkhazia because of the attempts to illegally break the economic blockade by trading with Turkey. In 1997, in one of the sessions of the Abkhaz Parliament responding to the coastal crisis, the question was raised about the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from the conflict zone. In this period, when deaths through hunger were not unknown in Abkhazia (on a territory on which the Georgians had initiated a war), the Abkhazians received unparalleled humanitarian and financial support from the international community.

With Putin’s accession to power, Russia’s foreign policy doctrine in relation to Abkhazia, as in relation to other unrecognised states, became more consistent and transparent. Now Russia did not hide the fact that she would resort even to unregulated conflict, and use the internal resources of the unrecognised states (in particular, by granting Russian citizenship en masse) to protect her own national interests on their Southern borders. Abkhazia for her part, with no hope even of neutrality from the international community in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, took as the basic principle of her foreign policy the idea of an association with Russia for the retention of state independence of Abkhazia: in reality a Russian protectorate.

Russia took three years to convince Abkhazia to sign the protocol of the Georgian-Abkhaz resolution[24], as the Abkhazians believed that it did not respond to their national interests, even though the future of Georgian-Russian political relations at this time largely depended on the success of this project. At the same time, Russia could not resolve to large-scale military operations on the territory of Abkhazia, as the net result of such an operation would be so unpredictable and could have forced Russia entirely out of the conflict zone. However, as observers have noted, in the armed conflict in the Gali region in 1998 the Russians acted against both Abkhazia and Georgia.

Later, Russia was able to secure the maximum integration of Abkhazia into her economic and political space, although legally she did not belong to her. At this time, Abkhazia considered that this corresponded to her own national interests, and primarily, to the interests of retaining national sovereignty. The political declarations from the Kremlin on the one hand about supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia, and the political declarations of the State Duma and different political parties about the possibility of recognising Abkhazian sovereignty on the other, did not have any meaning whatsoever for Russia’s particularly pragmatic policy of maximum rapprochement between the Russians and the Abkhazians.

The overall balance of Abkhazia’s foreign policy is arguably more loyal to the West (and to Western values, in the formation of a state’s democratic foundations), than would be desirable to many orthodox circles in Russia, and as too complimentary, in the opinion of Cold War orthodoxies towards the West. Her policies in relation to Russia lead us to the conclusion that Abkhazia has fulfilled the regional geopolitical function of a ‘buffer-trimmer’, as an alternative to becoming a ‘neutral buffer’ or ‘buffer-satellite’[25].

The existence of such a state in the region, implementing sufficiently independent and consistent policies in relation to her own national interests, objectively enables the retention of stability for ten or more years. If in some moment of crisis in the political discussions, Abkhazia had acceded to the demands of Georgia about the formation of territorial integrity, then as well as a permanent partisan war on the part of the Abkhazians and related peoples of the Northern Caucasus, there would have been such a serious disruption to the status quo on the wider stage (i.e. the balance of power between Russia and the US), that today we could be faced with any kind of geopolitical result not only in the Caucasus region, but also in the Caspian Sea region. It is not inconceivable that this could have meant wide-scale, even military confrontation not only between Russia and the US, but also between interested regional players such as Turkey, Iran, and also European powers.

Therefore the most pressing problems today are whether to respond to the interests of active participants, notably Russia and the US; whether to retain the status quo/ stability as the basis of the further peaceful evolution of development in the region; or whether radical changes are necessary in the balance of power, which would undoubtedly materialise in the event of Abkhazia being absorbed into Georgia or Russia, with unpredictable consequences. In the event of a positive answer, the geopolitical structure of the Caucasus would change radically in terms of the negotiability of the borders created by Stalin.

And then the following question also arises: are the leading actors in the international community – Russia and the US – prepared to recognise Abkhazia as a buffer state in the Caucasus in a political attempt to compromise and support military-political equilibrium, as Britain and Russia did in Afghanistan, but the USSR did not in relation to its Eastern European satellites after the Second World War?

The interests of long-term peace depend on unconventional solutions, the political will of the leaders, and an agreed level of governmental political responsibility for the support of international security. The stabilisation in the Balkans in particular also demanded a re-thinking of borders, and also precedents such as UN recognition of Croatia’s place as the last independent state within the Yugoslav federation before its disintegration.

In this scenario, the legal recognition of Abkhazia with independent buffer status would not signify isolation, but a means of softening and separating dangerously conflicting interests, and at the same time a means of uniting common regional security perspectives. This approach, besides responding to all previously stated aims, would fully accord with the national interests of Russia and the US as well.

A Russian diplomat expressed this accord succinctly: “We could have been left in a compromising position: the de-militarisation of the Caucasus region, and the proclamation of its neutrality or disintegration. If Russia had not decided to retain this territory in her orbit, then she would have preferred to have a secure buffer, than a military-political NATO bridgehead in her back yard”[26].

What is more, the agreement to recognise the ‘buffer status’ of Abkhazia would signify for the US the possible materialisation of her macro-economic and geostrategic projects in the South-East with minimal costs, with conditions of guaranteed stability behind her and a strategic consensus with her main rival in the Caucasus – Russia.

This would also retain the historical idea of a buffer state in the Caucasus for Turkey, as a stabilising and preventative factor in her mutual relations with Russia.

This factor becomes more significant in relation to new approaches to the problematic Black Sea area. It has been noted that “the basic necessity of the strategic buffer is best of all explained by its opposite… The Black Sea region is at the epicentre of great strategic attempts to bring stability to the widening European sphere and its borderlands – to the region of the Greater Middle East … the Greater Black Sea area begins to appear in a different light: instead of a peripheral position on the European continent, it begins to look like a key component on the West’s home front … a zone of contact between the European and North Atlantic communities, and a Greater Near East coming through the Black Sea – a new Fould corridor. The task of this generation for the introduction of stability to the Greater Near East is made significantly easier if we have a stable and successfully integrated Black Sea region. This is not simply a question of geographical position… and access to military bases allowing us to fight better the war on terrorism. We have a key interest in the countries of this region successfully turning into these kinds of democratic and stable societies, which can in their turn, serve as a platform for spreading Western values further to the East and the South.[27]”

However, the practical implementation of this concept outside agreed formulae of regional consensus will be understood by Russia as a new challenge from the West, and will become an additional flashpoint for escalating tensions in the Caucasus and the Caspian. This short-circuiting of geopolitics means that the question of cushioning conflict with the help of subregional buffers is by no means rhetorical in the case of Abkhazia.

From the point of view of Georgia’s interests, the ‘buffer’ status of Abkhazia would grant Georgia real independence, and neutralise the most powerful lever of external pressure, whilst retaining possibilities for economic partnership with Abkhazia and Russia. It would also provide the real possibility of long-term stability, so necessary for the participation of Georgia in global energy and communication projects.

The economic possibilities within the Caucasus will provide universal satisfaction of interests on the basis of the principle of mutual compensation, and the rationale of building a collective region-wide security. Of course, this is conditional on legitimate post-Soviet redistribution, and guaranteed stability (despite the lack of fully defined parameters of stability in the current ambitions of several small states in the Caucasus), within a fully-fledged integration of the Caucasus-Caspian region.

The role of the international community in these processes will be difficult to reassess. New strategy developments in international cooperation with relation to the unrecognised states have already been sounded out by Western and Russian experts. Practical action, especially in the implementation of the policies of the neighbourliness of the EU in the Southern Caucasus, will probably lead ultimately and inevitably to this.

The geopolitical potential of Abkhazia could be reclaimed in the new Caucasian paradigm of the international community, both as a natural buffer between conflicting or discordant regional and global interests, and at the same time as a connecting link in the fully-fledged integration of the whole region (including Northern and Southern Caucasus).

[1] The negotiation process is known to have begun from the discussion of the idea of a unified state.

[2] V.Avksentiev – Ethnic Conflict Resolution in the Search for a Paradigm.
http//www.stavsu.ru/CONFR/KONEL_CONF/SEC1/AVKS.HTML.17.01.2002.Pp.7-9.

[3] J.Burton(ed.) Conflikt: Human needs theory. L, 1990. Pp152-3. Quoted from: Conflict in Contemporary Russia. Problems of analysis and regulation. Editorial URSS. Moscow 2000.Pp39-40.

[4] For more detail: L.Taniya. Social opinion and the Georgian-Abkhaz peace-building process. From the New Eurasia collection: Russia and the countries of her Near Abroad. M:2002. No.14. Pp.44-118.

[5] N.Akhalaya. Security is more important than Economic Attractiveness. “Caucasian Accent” journal 2004. No.4, Dialogue No.3.

[6] Mitchell Ch. Necessitous man and conflict resolution: More basic human needs theory. In: Burton J. (ed.) Conflict: Human needs theory. Basingstoke. L.: MacMillan, 1990. P149-176. Cited from: Conflicts in Contemporary Russia. Problems of Analysis and Regulation. URSS editorial. Moscow 2000. Pp.39-40

[7] The exclusion of Abkhazia from the Georgian state will have a positive effect for the Georgian economy, considers Kakha Bendukidze. IA REGNUM. 17.06.2004. 17:46

[8] The UN mission on the definition of Abkhazia’s needs. 1998, p.23.

[9] V.Aksentiev. The Problem of escaping ethnic conflict: contemporary views. Materials of the Conference of 21st-22^nd May 2001, in Stavropol. www.Stavsu.ru/P.5

[10] The Stability Pact for the Caucasus/ M.Emerson, S.Chelak, N.Totchi (Editor); Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR). 2000. http:/www.Ceps.be/PUBS/2000/wd/stabpactruss/152rus.htp.

[11] G.Anchabadze. Under the Peace Sign. Interview in the journal Abkhazian Meridian. 2003. No17(15). P4.

[12] J.Cohen. The European Union and Southern Caucasus: the dilemma of neighbours. Journal Free Georgia, (Caucasus supplement). No.3. 22.07. P1

[13] B.Koppiters. Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus/ Moscow Karnega Centre. 2002. No.2. P.49

[14] L.Taniya. Variations of strategies of regulating the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict/ Central Asia and the Caucasus. 2003. No.5(29). P.55

[15] For more detail about models of integration: L.Taniya. “The Georgian-Abkaz conflict and priorities of international participation in the Caucasus”. In the Collection “The Caucasus region after the Cold War” / International institute of Strategic Research. London. 2004.

[16] I.V.Bocharnikov: The geopolitical expansion of Russia in the Caucasus, in 16-20. P.11 http//:www.e-journal.ru/p-time/. P.13

[17] G.Avetisyan. On the question of a Caucasian homeland and aspirations of pan-Turkism/ Questions of history. 1999 No.1-2. P.4. http//.www.Hayastan.ru/armvest/

[18] S.Lakoba. The history of Abkhazia. Sukhumi: Alashara. 1991. P.312

[19] B.Koppiters: The Caucasus as a complex of security. in the collection: Disputed borders in the Caucasus. M.: All World. 1996. P.215

[20] A.Rondeli: Particularities of the process of forming a regional complex of security in the Southern Caucasus. From the collection: Post-Communist Democratic transformation and geopolitics in the Southern Caucasus. Tbilisi. 1998. P116.

[21] P.Bit. Those who cushion the blows. http:/petrobit.by.ru/art/thought/buffer.html. P4.

[22] A.Rondeli. Georgia in Post-Soviet space/ Caucasian Regional Research. Tbilisi 1996. No1. P.95

[23] O.Pe and E.Remakle. The politics of the UN and OSCE in the Transcaucasus region. From the collection: Disputed borders in the Caucasus. 1996. M.: Whole World. P.129.

[24] The protocols of the Georgian-Abkhaz negotiations were examined in the period 1995-8, when Russia was forced to re-take the initiative in the negotiations from the Western mediators. The protocols envisaged different models which would be of advantage to a federal reintegrated Abkhazia within Georgia.

[25] A.Rondeli: Particularities of the formation of a regional complex of security in the Southern Caucasus. From the collection: Post-Communist transformations and geopolitics in the Southern Caucasus. Tbilisi 1998. P.116. As is noted in the article, a buffer-trimmer is able to “influence stronger neighbours, between which it is situated”, maybe to some extent manoeuvre, and lead a more or less active foreign policy.

[26] V.Degoev. Models of Caucasus-wide security: for and against. P.6. On the web-site: PROJECT XX1. Globalisation for the CIS. Http:/Cis.ng.ru/2001

[27] R.Amsus, B.Jackson. The Black Sea and redistribution of freedom. Http:/www.rusk.ru/07.09.2004./Pp5,6. Regarding the Greater Black Sea, experts understand “a Euro-Asian corridor of energy transfer, binding the Euro-Atlantic system with the Caspian sources of energy and states of Central Asia.” The Black Sea system is also spread “To the North from Transnistria, Odessa, and Sukhum, because a stable system would also require solving “shameful conflicts” along the North-Eastern coast, and access to the large trading rivers flowing into the Black Sea: The Danube, Dnestr, and Dneiper”. Into the Greater Black Sea “all the states of the Southern Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan should also be included”.