Georgia woos its neighbours, by Akhmet Yarlykapov - IISS Caucasus Security Insight
Russia’s political control, however, will thwart Tbilisi’s ambition to become a regional centre
The tectonic processes that the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia triggered off on both sides of the Caucasus range could have serious long-term implications. One aspect of these processes, which has remained hidden from outside observers, has been that, by and large, the populations of almost all the region’s republics have reacted positively to the decisive stance of the Russian federal authorities in the conflict, including their recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Many experts, myself among them, thought that recognition would lead to an increase in separatist sentiments in the ethnic republics of the North Caucasus. This has not happened, however, at least not to a visible extent. There are several reasons. One is that the two Chechen wars could be said to have inoculated the residents of all the republics against separatism. There is no prospect that ethnic separatism will develop into another armed conflict, at least in the near future. A second reason is that ethnic movements are too divided and isolated from each other. Finally, separatism in the North Caucasus has become almost entirely a religious affair, with the majority of the armed separatist groups fighting for an independent Caucasus Emirate rather than the independence of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Circassia or Dagestan.
Yet everything in the Caucasus has its repercussions, especially such major developments as the recognition of regions’ independence. This move by the federal authorities has met, without doubt, with approval among the Circassians and Ossetians, albeit with some exceptions (some of the national Circassian movements are highly unlikely to approve of any steps taken by the federal government). The Ingush thought that, having extended considerable support to the Ossetians and having recognised South Ossetia’s independence, Moscow would use the momentum of the Ingush initiative to put pressure on the Ossetians to reach a resolution of the outstanding territorial problem of Prigorodny district. It is not clear how many more disillusioned young people have now left for the forests to join the rebels fighting for the creation of a Caucasus Emirate. And it will be some time before we find out what deep processes in the Circassian movement have been triggered off by the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it is unlikely that the movement’s leaders have fully understood the consequences themselves.
Georgia, in the meantime, is trying to find pressure points it can use to restore its influence in the Caucasus in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. It is no secret that since 1990 Georgia has been increasingly losing influence in the North Caucasus. This has been largely due to its rash attempts to use brute force to suppress any hint of separatism – efforts that have led to it losing two regions and to a decline of influence among other nations of the Caucasus. It is sufficient to cite the controversial issue of Georgia’s resettlement of 5,000 Kvareli Avars in the early 1990s. This could not have won Georgia any admirers among the Avars in Dagestan.
There are even deeper processes taking place. In the years of the Soviet Union, Tbilisi was a cultural and scientific centre for the nations of the North Caucasus. In contrast to the Armenians and the Azeris, who are culturally closer to the Middle East, the Georgians share a distinct Caucasus culture. A further factor was Tbilisi’s geographical proximity, with its strong school of Caucasian studies and Caucasian linguistics. Much of the old North Caucasus intelligentsia was nurtured in Tbilisi and acted as an agent of Georgian influence. Its members preserved former contacts and memories of the Georgia that brought them up. But the dropping of Russian and the move to Georgian and English as languages of instruction have drastically reduced the number of North Caucasus residents studying in Georgia. The new intelligentsia of the North Caucasus does not know Georgia, and the older generation’s accounts of its past experiences are for it water under the bridge. Tbilisi is trying to remedy this by allowing young people from the North Caucasus republics to obtain grants to study in Georgia and by organising special programmes and academic forums. But the measures are insufficient to restore its influence as a scientific and educational centre of the Caucasus to its previous level.
Introducing a visa-free regime and discussion of the Circassian issue in parliament (including the May 2011 decision of the Georgian parliament to pass the genocide resolution), have often yielded unexpected results. A visa-free regime introduced exclusively for the residents of the North Caucasus has indeed made life much simpler for the academics from the region who attend conferences and other events in Tbilisi. Also, a few pilgrims on their Hadj have started trickling through Tbilisi for pragmatic reasons. Yet no more than a thousand residents of the North Caucasus have made use of their right for a visa-free crossing of the border. At the same time, their differentiation from the rest of the Russian citizens has made them feel alienated. Moreover, many Circassians consider Tbilisi's apparent interest in the Circassian issue disingenuous; they think that instead of wanting to help them Tbilisi is seeking to use them to settle scores with Moscow and for its own purely pragmatic purposes.
Georgia’s activity in the information arena, especially, with regard to the Circassian issue and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, has undoubtedly had an impact on Russian policies in the North Caucasus. The Russian authorities’ response has not always been commensurate, or comprehensible to the region’s residents. In particular, the separation from the North Caucasus Federal District (created in January 2010) of Adygeya, an enclave of Krasnodar Krai, provoked a negative reaction among the majority of the region’s ethnic republics, which felt deeply offended. Another important development has been the federal government’s softening of its stance on the issue of recognising the Circassian ethnic component and its inclusion in the Sochi Olympics. Nevertheless, Moscow appears to have failed to develop a clear-cut strategy and a coherent policy in relation to the region: despite ploughing in money and investing in tourism development projects in Kabardino-Balkariya, many have been brought to the verge of collapse by a series of terrorist attacks aimed at tourists and infrastructure.
Georgia is clearly attempting to compete with Russia in the North Caucasus by appealing to the sentiments of the region’s residents through a common culture and shared traditions. The general perception of Georgia among the populations of the North Caucasus is positive, but it will not succeed in becoming a regional centre in the near future. It is Moscow, first and foremost, that exercises political control there. Despite problems with growing nationalism, this rests on a strong all-Russian identity among the majority of North Caucasus residents. In addition, the weight of past mistakes, which have not been rectified, still presses heavily on Georgia. No matter how many times the marginalised elements from the Circassian ethnic movements discuss the problem of the Circassian genocide in the nineteenth century Caucasus war, the majority of Circassians themselves remember the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-93, in which many Circassians fought alongside the Abkhaz, and they honour the memory of its heroes. For Georgia to succeed as a new regional power it has to put an end to information wars and to its attempts to ignore Moscow as the central actor with which it needs to come to an agreement sooner or later.
Akhmet Yarlykapov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences. He has also served as a Luce Foundation Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington.