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The Evolution of the Sultanic Fisc and *al-Dhakhīrah* during the Circassian Mamluk Period

I have shown in a previous article that al-Zāhir Barqūq, the first sultan of the Circassian Mamluks (r. 784–91, 792–801/1382–89, 1390–99), possessed several private properties, especially landed estates, in such forms as *milk* (pl. *amlāk*; privately-owned land) or *waqf* (pl. *awqāf*; Islamic endowment) land, and that he organized their management through the establishment of a new bureau, the *Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah*.¹ Although it is unsurprising that the Mamluk sultans possessed private assets that were independent of the state purse, their inclination to hold private property—especially in the shape of agricultural lands—only became popular in the late fourteenth century. From Barqūq’s reign onwards, successive sultans developed a variety of ways to increase the financial resources of the sultanic fisc. Eventually, the scale of the sultanic fisc would reach its apogee under the reigns of al-Ashraf Qāyrbāy (r. 872–901/1468–96) and al-Ashraf Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī (r. 906–22/1501–16), two prominent sultans from the late Mamluk period.²

Al-Dhakhīrah, a term that is frequently found in the sources from the Circassian Mamluk period, is key for understanding the sultanic fisc. *Al-Dhakhīrah*, which originally meant “treasure” in Arabic,³ was a technical term that related to the sultan’s finances during the Circassian Mamluk period, and which accrued new meanings over time. However, because little attention has been given to the term, the meaning of the term and its transformation are not clear. I believe that a more detailed investigation of *al-Dhakhīrah* is essential if we are to arrive at a proper understanding of the fiscal system of the Circassian Mamluk sultanate.

To this end, this article considers the state, role, and development of the sultanic fisc under the Circassian sultans, as well as the background that necessitated its establishment and development. Throughout the course of the article, I will

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¹ Igarashi Daisuke, “The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq,” *Orient* 43 (2008).

² Igarashi Daisuke, “The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyrbāy,” *Mamlūk Studies Review (MSR)* 13, no. 1 (2009): 27–51; Carl F. Petry, *Protectors or Praetorians?: The Last Mamlūk Sultans and Egypt’s Waning as a Great Power* (Albany, 1994), chaps. 6, 7; Miura Toru, “Urban Society in Damascus as the Mamluk Era was Ending,” *MSR* 10, no. 1 (2006): 158, 168–76.

³ Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab* (Beirut, n.d.), 4:302–3; al-Firūzābādī, *Al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ* (Cairo, 1306 A. H.), 2:34; E. W. Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon* (London and Edinburgh, 1863–93), 3:956.

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demonstrate that significant changes occurred in the financial system during the Circassian Mamluk period. I will make clear that the difficulties, restructuring, and eventual bankruptcy of the state's finances arose against the same background as the expansion and increasing role of the sultanic fisc—both phenomena were organically united and mutually influential. In addition, I will also outline the overall historical development that occurred in the structure of the Mamluk sultanate.

WHAT IS *AL-DHAKHĪRAH*?

To begin, I will investigate how the term *al-Dhakhīrah* has been interpreted by contemporary scholars, and how it is explained in the chancery manual sources of the Mamluk period. As I indicated above, little attention has been given to the term; what is agreed upon is that some members of the sultan's financial staff bore *al-Dhakhīrah* in their titles (such as *nāṣir al-dhakhīrah*), and they have been regarded, somewhat obscurely, as managers of the sultan's own treasures.⁴ However, beyond this rather vague common ground, scholars have presented differing interpretations of the meaning and role of *al-Dhakhīrah*. For instance, A. N. Poliak says, "The vacant fief (i.e., *iqṭā'*) was managed and exploited by the department designated as *dīwān al-dhakhīrah* until its grant by the sultan to another feudatory."⁵ 'Āmir Nāṣir has a different interpretation of this *dīwān* and suggests that it was a department responsible for managing the sultan's *iqṭā'* lands—all the revenues from which were designated to the sultan himself.⁶ In addition, several studies that have been conducted on the spice trade between Mamluk Egypt and Venice have identified the "dacchieri"—the Mamluk governmental office that was in charge of the trade and that appears several times in the Venetian documentary sources—as cognate with the Arabic term *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁷

Disparate descriptions of *al-Dhakhīrah* also occur in the chancery manual sources from the Mamluk era. Judging from the fact that al-'Umarī's *Masālik* (written in

⁴ William Popper, *Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans 1382–1468: Systematic Notes to Ibn Taghri Birdī's Chronicles of Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955–57), 1:93, 98; Bernadette Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration dans l'État militaire mamlūk (IXe/XVe siècle)* (Damascus, 1992), 54; Muḥammad Muḥammad Amin, *Al-Awqāf wa-al-Ḥayāh al-Ijtimā'iyah fī Miṣr 648–923 A.H./1250–1517 A.D.* (Cairo, 1980), 119–21; Adam Sabra, *Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 1250–1517* (Cambridge, 2000), 72.

⁵ A. N. Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the Lebanon, 1250–1900* (London, 1939; repr. Philadelphia, 1977), 22.

⁶ 'Āmir Najīb Mūsá Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtisādīyah fī Miṣr fī al-'Aṣr al-Mamlūkī* (Amman, 2003), 116–17.

⁷ John Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter of 877/1473," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (BSOAS)* 24 (1961): 206, 211, note 7; idem, "A Mamluk Ambassador to Venice in 913/1507," *BSOAS* 26 (1963): 528, note 3.

the middle of the eighth/fourteenth century)⁸ and al-Qalqashandī's *Ṣubḥ* (written in 814/1412)⁹—two of the most important chancery manual sources—do not mention any offices or works that related to *al-Dhakhīrah*, it seems that, in the period of the late Bahri Mamluks and the beginning of the Circassian Mamluks, when these two sources were composed, *al-Dhakhīrah* had not yet been established as an organization or an office. Thereafter, there is an abridged description of the *Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah* which is found in al-Zāhirī's *Zubdah* (written in 846/1422),¹⁰ as follows: “The *Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah*. This is one of the most important bureaus (*dawāwīn*). The money (*māl*) of *al-Dhakhīrah* was collected from various resources (*jihāt*) to it. It has a *nāẓir* (manager) and members of staff (*mubāshirūn*).”¹¹ We are given no specific information about the institution in this simple explanation. However, another source—known as al-Khālidi's “Al-Maqṣad al-Rafīʿ” (hereafter cited as *Dīwān al-Inshāʿ*)—provides a more detailed description, as follows:

The *naẓar al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah*. These two (i.e., *amlāk* and *dhakhīrah*) are income sources bound together (*humā jihatāni mutaḳāranatāni*). *Al-amlāk* means [the assets] that are purchased for the sultan or his relatives (*aqāribhu*), such as arable lands (*ḍiyāʿ*), houses (*ribāʿ*), and others relating to them. *Al-Dhakhīrah* means [the assets] that are rented (*mā yustaʿjar*) for the sultan such as tax districts (*nawāḥi*), agricultural lands (*mazāriʿ*), water wheels (*dawālib*), and others. A person appointed to this office takes charge of incomes such as [those from the assets that were] purchased for the sultan and [were] sold from [his hand], and those rented for him and leased out from him. He is an administrator (*mutaṣarrif*) who disburses [the money for] that which should be disbursed, and conveys [the money for] that which should be conveyed to the treasury (*khazāʿin*). A military man sometimes holds the office.¹²

According to this description, *al-amlāk* referred to “the sultan's private real

⁸ Al-ʿUmārī, *Masālik al-Abṣār fī Mamālik al-Amṣār*, ed. Ayman Fuʿād Sayyid (Cairo, 1985).

⁹ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʿ* (Cairo, 1913–22). As for its date of composition, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., “Al-Ḳalkashandī.”

¹⁰ As for its date of composition, see ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, “Al-Rawḍ al-Bāsim fī Ḥawādith al-ʿUmr wa-al-Tarājim,” Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana MSS Vaticano Arabo 728, 729, 1: fol. 64r.

¹¹ Al-Zāhirī, *Kitāb Zubdat Kashf al-Mamālik*, ed. Paul Ravaisse (Paris, 1894), 110.

¹² An anonymous chancery manual known as al-Khālidi's “al-Maqṣad al-Rafīʿ,” Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS Arabe 4439 (hereafter cited as *Dīwān al-Inshāʿ*), fol. 137v. As for the source, see Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration*, 16.

estates” and *al-Dhakhīrah* referred to “the sultan’s leasehold lands.”

To sum up, there are discrepancies in the interpretation of *al-Dhakhīrah* among scholars and among sources. However, if we accept that *al-Dhakhīrah* underwent a transformation, then most of the interpretations presented above may be regarded as true. I will show in this article that, as the sultanic fisc evolved throughout the Circassian Mamluk period, so too did the term *al-Dhakhīrah*, taking on new meanings with time. I will start by examining instances where the word appears in the sources from the period between the late eighth/fourteenth century and the beginning of the ninth/fifteenth century.

During the period under consideration, the term *dhakhīrah* (pl. *dhakhā’ir*) usually connoted “movable property,” in the ordinary sense of the word—cash, gold, silver, jewels, luxurious textiles, and other luxury items—and especially referred to the movable property held by sultans and amirs. On the other hand, private real estate such as lands and houses were distinguished from these goods and were referred to as *amlāk*. As for the sultan’s *dhakhīrah*, the descriptions of the *nāzīr al-dhakhīrah*, i.e., the controller of the sultan’s *dhakhīrah*, emerged during Sultan al-Ashraf Shaḥbān’s reign (764–78/1363–77). After this, al-Zāhir Barqūq, who was enthroned in 784/1382, strived to increase his private wealth through the acquisition of private lands and the transformation of these into *waqf*, and then set up an organization for the management of the properties. Following the establishment of *Dīwān al-Amlāk*—a bureau responsible for administering his private lands—in 797/1395, he established the office of *ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah* in 799/1397. Consequently, his movable, unmovable, and *waqf* properties were regarded as “the sultan’s private property” and thus came to be managed exclusively within this office.¹³

Judging from these examples, we may say that, during this period, the term *dhakhīrah* was used to refer to the private movable goods of powerful figures, especially the sultans. However, according to the description of *Dīwān al-Inshā’* mentioned above, after this time, the term came to be applied to “the sultan’s leasehold lands.” We shall now examine the circumstances under which the meaning of the word changed, by considering the problem of the land system in this period.

Starting in the late Bahri Mamluk period, the governmental domains—lands from which the Mamluk government collected land tax (*kharāj*)—came to be leased by powerful amirs for negligible amounts. This issue was seen as one of the main causes of the financial difficulties that the government of the time was experiencing. These leased lands (*musta’jarāt*) are often identified in the sources as one of the financial resources of powerful figures. For example, Shaykhū al-

¹³ Igarashi, “The Private Property and *Awqāf*,” 171–75.

Nāṣirī (d. 758/1357), the *atābak al-‘asākīr* (commander-in-chief) of the late Bahri Mamluks, earned an income of over 200,000 dirhams per day from his *iqṭā‘*, *amlāk*, and *musta’jarāt*.¹⁴ The leasing of governmental domains seems to have become popular during the unstable political and economic circumstances that occurred during the reign of the late Bahri Mamluks, in the wake of changes such as the weakening of the sultan’s power and the decrease of agricultural production caused by the Black Death and its adverse effect on the *iqṭā‘* system.¹⁵ If we consider that the lease of the governmental domain was popularly adapted by amirs as a way of supplementing their personal income, it is no wonder that the sultan—who himself was originally a Mamluk amir—held lands by lease just as other amirs did. Actually, Barqūq seems to have acquired leasehold land both before and after his enthronement as sultan.¹⁶ His son Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj (r. 801–8, 808–15/1399–1405, 1405–12) also had a special *dīwān* administering his *musta’jarāt* and *ḥimāyah* (protection fee; this will be discussed latter) “in the same way as other amirs do.”¹⁷

How then did the term *al-Dhakhīrah* come to mean “the sultan’s leasehold land”? The first instance where it clearly relates to agricultural land can be seen in the following description, which concerns the land survey that was carried out in 799/1397, late in Barqūq’s reign: “On 2 Jumādā I 799 (1 February 1397), the sultan (Barqūq) ordered Amir Ḥusām al-Dīn Ḥusayn al-Gharsī, the *shādd al-dawāwīn* (superintendent of bureaus), to go to Upper Egypt and to survey (*miṣāḥah*) the state lands (*bilād al-dawlah al-sharīfah*), privately-owned lands (*amlāk*), and [lands of] *al-Dhakhīrah* [of the area].”¹⁸

It is clear that the term *al-Dhakhīrah* in this description does not refer to “the sultan’s movables,” the general meaning of this term in this period; however, it is unclear what the term actually does refer to here. While it is possible that it referred to “the sultan’s leasehold land,” this must be regarded as unlikely as the evidence suggests that it had not acquired such a meaning around this time. Table 1 lists those people who held the post of *ustādār* (director) or *nāẓir* (vice-director) in the *dīwān*, who were responsible for administering the sultan’s private financial resources, such as *amlāk*, *awqāf*, and *dhakhīrah* during the period between Ibn al-Ṭablāwī’s first appointment as *ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah* in

¹⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi wa-al-Mustawfā ba‘da al-Wāfi* (Cairo, 1985–2006), 6:260.

¹⁵ Igarashi Daisuke, “The Establishment and Development of *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*: Its Background and Implications,” *MSR* 10, no. 1 (2006): 123.

¹⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk* (Cairo, 1939–72), 3:402, 858–59; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah* (Damascus, 1977–97), 1:580, 621; Ibn al-Furāt, *Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk*, vols. 7–9 (Beirut, 1936–42), 9:438.

¹⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *Al-Mawā‘iẓ wa-al-I‘tibār fī Dhikr al-Khiṭaṭ wa-al-Āthār* (London, 2002–4), 1: 299.

¹⁸ Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:461.

799/1397 (mentioned above) and 844/1441, the beginning of the reign of Sultan al-Zāhir Jaqmaq. However, as the table indicates, the historical sources written by roughly contemporary authors, such as Ibn al-Furāt, Ibn Ḥijjī, al-Maqrīzī, Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, Ibn Ḥajar, and al-ʿAynī, as well as those written by historians of a later generation, such as Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Ṣayrafī, and al-Sakhāwī, disagree with each other over the title of their posts. Moreover, inconsistencies are found within different sources written by the same author, and sometimes even within a single source. In addition to *dhakhīrah*, this post was also associated with one or more of the types of agricultural property, such as *amlāk*, *awqāf*, *mustaʿjarāt*, and *ḥimāyah*. In a few cases, the post is simply referred to as “*ustādār al-khāṣṣ al-sultānī*,” i.e., the director of the sultan’s private property. By way of example, Ibn al-Ṭablāwī, the first appointee of the post, is described as “*ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awqāf wa-al-dhakhīrah*” by Ibn al-Furāt and Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah; in contrast, he is described as “*ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-awqāf*” by al-Maqrīzī, as “*ustādār al-dhakhīrah wa-al-amlāk*” by Ibn Ḥajar and al-Sakhāwī, and simply as “*ustādār al-dhakhīrah*” by al-ʿAynī and al-Ṣayrafī. He is also described as “*ustādār al-khāṣṣ*” by Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, as “*ustādār al-khāṣṣ al-sultānī*” by Ibn Ḥajar, and as “*ustādār khāṣṣ lil-sultān*” by al-Sakhāwī. To prevent confusion of the titles of the post, hereafter I will designate this office as “the sultan’s private financier.” Judging from the fact that this office was sometimes designated “*ustādār al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah wa-al-mustaʿjarāt wa-al-awqāf al-sultānīyah*,” writing both *dhakhīrah* and *mustaʿjarāt* (Nos. 4, 7, 8) together, we cannot say that the term *dhakhīrah* was always used according to the particular sense of “leasehold land.”

Among the 57 instances in which the sultan’s private financiers are mentioned in the sources, most frequent are the cases in which only the two terms *amlāk* and *dhakhīrah* are attached to the title of office, such as *ustādār* or *nāẓir al-amlāk wa-al-dhakhīrah* (27 cases); the next most frequent are the cases in which only the term—*dhakhīrah*—is attached (8 cases). Among the 9 cases in which only one type of term is attached to the title of office, 8 cases include *dhakhīrah*. In contrast, there are rare cases in which the *dhakhīrah* is not mentioned in reference to the office (9 of 57). Such trends seem to be clearer in the sources that were written in the later period. From these examples, it seems reasonable to suppose that during the process through which various types of properties and resources were being administered under the sole control of the sultan’s private financier, the term *dhakhīrah* lost its original sense of treasure (movables) and came to be used as a term that represented the sultan’s properties, especially agricultural lands that were held in various ways and forms. We shall see each type of the sultan’s financial resources in the following section.

THE SULTAN'S PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

As my previous article made clear, Barqūq held a large amount of real estate in the shape of *amlāk* and *awqāf*. This way of holding private assets became popular for those sultans who succeeded him, too. Table 2 lists the *milk* and *waqf* assets that were held by Barqūq, al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh (r. 815–24/1412–21), and al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 825–42/1422–38), three sultans of the early Circassian period, on the basis of the archival sources. As the table shows, the number of each sultan's assets steadily increased (Barqūq: 33 → Shaykh: 43 → Barsbāy: 81). The list shows that all of these early Circassian Mamluk sultans held farm lands, urban estates, and other assets such as water-use facilities in villages throughout Egypt and Syria. The proportion of farm lands that each successive sultan held increased particularly sharply (Barqūq: 30.3% → Shaykh: 46.5% → Barsbāy: 50.6%). This is especially the case for farm land in Egypt; Barqūq held only three tracts (9.1%); however, Barsbāy's farm land accounted for about half the number of his total assets (39; 48.1%). It is possible that these assets included some that had been acquired personally in the period when they were amirs, before their enthronements, or that were acquired through fair transactions; however, I believe that their status as sultan facilitated their acquisition of assets on such a large scale, especially in the case of farm lands. As I described in my previous article, Barqūq acquired state lands (*amlāk bayt al-māl*), including governmental domains and *iqṭā'* lands, as his private property, or he converted them into his *waqf* properties.¹⁹ The fact that the proportion of assets that were farm land continuously rose under the reigns of Shaykh and Barsbāy indicates that the conversion of state land into *amlāk* and *awqāf* steadily continued. In Rabī' II 835/December 1431 under Barsbāy's reign, some ulama (Islamic intellectuals) objected to the legality of Barsbāy's purchase of state lands through the *wakīl bayt al-māl* (the agent of the state treasury), who was appointed by Barsbāy himself, and the successive conversion of these lands to his *waqf* property. As the *waqf* deeds indicate, this episode also shows that the scale of state land privatization and transformation into *waqf* undertaken by Barsbāy was on a larger scale than any of his predecessors had engaged in. Indeed, it seems that it was on such an unprecedented scale that the ulama could not overlook it, despite the fact that they were dependent on the income generated from *awqāf* and usually tended to protect the *waqf* system. However, the objection was rejected and the legality of the sultan's establishment of *awqāf* through such means was confirmed.²⁰ The sultans' holding of property through *waqf* endowment would continue after him until the end of the Mamluk sultanate.

In common with other powerful figures of the government, such as amirs and

¹⁹ Igarashi, "The Private Property and *Awqāf*," 172–79.

²⁰ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr* (Cairo, 1969–98), 3:477–79.

civilians, the sultans leased the governmental domains for themselves. A large proportion of the sultan's *musta'jarāt* had existed in al-Ghawr, a fertile agricultural region in Syria, since the beginning of the Circassian period, although it seems likely that there were probably many leasehold lands in various regions across Egypt and Syria.²¹ In addition, the *nāzir al-musta'jarāt al-sultāniyah bi-al-Shām*—the controller of the sultan's leasehold lands in Syria—was appointed in 824/1421.²² *Dīwān al-Inshā'*, which identified the *dhakhīrah* as the sultan's leasehold land, is likely to have been written around the reign of Barsbāy,²³ at the same time as the controversy about the legitimacy of the sultan's purchase of state lands and transformation of them into *waqf* arose. It is likely that, under such circumstances, the land that was accumulated through the lease of the state lands—the legality of which was unchallenged on the whole—constituted an increasingly large proportion of the sultan's private property. This seems to be an underlying cause of the transformation of these personally-held lands into “the sultan domain,” as will be discussed later. However, it is unlikely that the sultan actually paid the relevant rental fees or the cost of purchase to the financial bureaus of the Egyptian or Syrian government, even for land that was ostensibly “*musta'jarāt*” or “*amlāk*.”

The *ḥimāyah* was another important source of revenue connected with agricultural land. The sultan's private financier was also in charge of the sultan's *ḥimāyah*. The *ḥimāyah* represented powerful figures' private protection over local areas, and it involved their collecting protection fees in exchange for protecting the village against the “exploitation” of local governors (*wālī, kāshif*),²⁴ resulting in the exclusion of the governmental supervision by the local governors from the protected areas.²⁵ This was one of the private income sources of powerful figures

²¹ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 4:190. It is reasonable to suppose that special financial agents and civilians appointed to al-Ghawr were in charge of the sultan's *musta'jarāt* in the region. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:268, 462, 603, 608; 4:150, 266; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1008; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-al-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1970–94), 3:390; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith al-Duhūr fī Madā al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, vol. 1 (Cairo, 1990) (hereafter cited as *Ḥawādith*¹), 1:224.

²² Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, 3:249–50. Barqūq also assigned a person to take charge of his own *musta'jarāt* and *matjar* (mentioned later) to Damascus (Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:438; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 3:858–59; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 1:580).

²³ Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l'administration*, 16.

²⁴ The *ḥimāyah* also represented powerful figures' personal protection over commercial activities. As for the *ḥimāyah*, see al-Asadī, *Al-Taysīr wa-al-Itibār wa-al-Tahrīr wa-al-Ikhtibār fīmā Yajib min Ḥusn al-Tadbīr wa-al-Taṣarruf wa-al-Ikhtiyār* (Cairo, 1968), 95–96, 135–36; John L. Meloy, “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and the State in the Circassian Mamluk Period,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 47, no. 2 (2004).

²⁵ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith al-Duhūr fī Madā al-Ayyām wa-al-Shuhūr*, ed. William Popper (Berkeley,

such as amirs and high-ranking civilians that increased after Shaykh's reign.²⁶ This indicates the sultan's conflicting positions; while he dominated the Mamluk state through the governmental machinery in his official capacity, he himself gave private protection to the specific areas in his private capacity, interrupting the governmental supervision over the area.

We are now able to see that the Circassian sultans strove to accumulate agricultural land in various ways for their private income sources, and the scale of this accumulation grew steadily. The circumstances that led to their acquisition of private income sources were the chronic financial difficulties of the times, which were mainly caused by the alienation of the state lands since the late Bahri Mamluk period.²⁷ Despite this, the sultans took countermeasures against this alienation of state lands in their capacity as the head of the government, while simultaneously trying to acquire state land personally and transform it to *amlāk*, *awqāf*, *musta'jarāt*, and *ḥimāyah*, just as other amirs were doing, thereby contributing to the alienation of state land. How can we explain this baffling and contradictory behavior? It is hardly surprising that the sultans, who were originally amirs, continued to pursue the holding of private property, as the other amirs did. More noteworthy is the reorganization of the financial system of the government that occurred in the beginning of the Circassian Mamluk period. With the establishment of al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, the state's finances began to be administered by three independent *dīwāns*, namely, the Dīwān al-Wizārah, the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ, and al-Dīwān al-Mufrad, each of which was responsible for providing certain allowances from its own resources.²⁸ Although in theory, after paying expenses, the remainder of each *dīwān*'s income should have been delivered to the sultan, in practice this was actually impossible, due to the chronic financial difficulties of the times. Inevitably, in order to raise money that they needed for themselves for things such as purchasing slaves to increase the Royal Mamluk corps (*al-mamālīk al-sultānīyah*), paying bonuses, and granting rewards to political supporters, the sultans needed to generate their own revenue sources independently of the state's finances.

Next, we will examine the office that held control over the sultan's private properties. The *Dīwān al-Amlāk wa-al-Awqāf wa-al-Dhakhīrah* was the special financial bureau that was established under Barqūq's reign for this purpose. However, as Table 1 indicates, the *ustādārs* or *nāẓirs* of this *dīwān* were not mentioned in the sources until over twenty years after the death of Taqī al-Dīn

1930–42) (hereafter cited as *Ḥawādith*²), 458.

²⁶ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Al-Nujūm al-Zāhīrah fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-al-Qāhīrah* (Cairo, 1963–72), 16:160.

²⁷ Igarashi, "Establishment and Development," 120–24.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 127–28.

‘Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Abī Shākīr in 819/1417; in fact, they do not occur until late in Barsbāy’s reign. I suggest that this was due to the fact that the sultanic treasury (*al-khizānah al-sharīfah/khizānat al-sultān*; pl. *khazā’in*), which kept the incomes in custody, only gradually became organized into its final form as its role expanded into the sphere of financial affairs and it came to supervise the sultan’s private property directly. Although the term *khizānah*—meaning “treasury” in Arabic—occurs frequently in the sources throughout the Mamluk period, that to which the term actually referred transformed over time. In the Bahri Mamluk period, the state’s income was delivered to the public coffers (*Bayt al-Māl/al-Khizānah [al-Kubrā]*) in the Citadel (*Qal‘at al-Jabal*) in Cairo. Then, with the establishment of *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ* in the third reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (709–41/1310–41), a large amount of tax revenue flowed into the private coffers (*Khizānat al-Khāṣṣ*), which were under the jurisdiction of *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ*, the director of the *dīwān*. As the result, the public coffers became redundant and were finally converted into a warehouse for the robes of honor (*khil‘ah*) that the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ* was responsible for procuring and providing.²⁹ However, when the *majlis al-mashūrah* (the Supreme Council), consisting of seven high-ranking amirs, assumed the reins of government in 748/1347 in the wake of the sultan’s loss of real political power, the private coffers were put under the jurisdiction of the *ra’s nawbat al-umarā’* (the head of guards of amirs).³⁰ Consequently, the *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ* lost its original role as the special organization that was responsible for administrating the sultan’s “private property,” as the name indicated; hereafter, it became one of the official financial bureaus of the government.

Conversely, in the Circassian Mamluk period, the sultanic treasury was put under the direct control of the sultan, holding its own revenue sources independently of the financial bureaus of the government. This sultanic *khizānah* was located inside the sultan’s private area in the Citadel and was superintended by a *khāzindār* (treasurer), a eunuch who had been appointed to the role, which acquired further importance as the treasury came increasingly under the sultan’s direct control.³¹ This office of *khāzindār* originated from the office of *khāzindār al-dhakhirah*, which had been occupied by a eunuch, Sandal al-Manjakī, under

²⁹ Al-‘Umārī, *Masālik*, 61; al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:734; Hassanein Rabie, *The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169–1341* (London, 1972), 144. After its conversion to the warehouse for *khil‘ahs*, the public coffers came to be called “the supreme coffers (*al-Khizānah al-Kubrā*),” then “the coffers of the *Khāṣṣ* (*Khizānat al-Khāṣṣ*)” because it was under the jurisdiction of the *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ* (al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 3:472). The coffers disappeared, being converted into a prison by Amīr Miṭāsh in 791/1389 (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 3:674; idem, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:734–35).

³⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 2:750–51.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 3:1067–68; *Dīwān al-Inshā’*, fol. 127r.

Barqūq;³² we must discriminate between this office and that of the *amīr khāzindār* (it is also usually referred to in the sources simply as *khāzindār*), a position which was filled by an amir of ten (*amīr ‘asharah*) or amir of forty (*amīr al-ṭablkhānah*) and was included among the military functionaries.³³ Thus, the sultan's treasury of the Circassian sultans was a new treasury in which the sultan's personal money and property, which had increased through Barqūq's establishment of the *Dīwān al-Amlāk*, were deposited, independent of the financial bureaus of the state.

Incidentally, with the enlargement of the sultan's private property in the period during and after Barqūq, the eunuch *khāzindār* in charge of the sultan's treasury gained importance and became influential over the government; this was especially the case when Zayn al-Dīn Marjān al-Hindī assumed the office of the *khāzindār* under Sultan Shaykh.³⁴ During his term of office, the sultan's treasury gained exclusive income sources and assumed new roles.³⁵ Around this time, the sources frequently mention the office of *nāẓir al-khizānah*, the accountant of the sultan's treasury.³⁶ In particular, members of the Jī‘ān family (Banū al-Jī‘ān) were employed in this area until the very end of the Mamluk sultanate.³⁷ The fact that the post of *nāẓir al-musta’jarāt al-sultāniyah bi-al-Shām* was concurrently held by

³² Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, 9:128, 429; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 2:28; Ibn Qāḍī Shuhbah, *Tārīkh*, 4:48; Igarashi, “The Private Property and *Awqāf*,” 173.

³³ Whereas a eunuch held the post of *khāzindār*, at the same time another person was at the post as *amīr khāzindār*. For example, see Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:29–30, 106, 195, 333–34, 409–10.

³⁴ Al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Ḍaw’ al-Lāmi‘ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsī‘* (Cairo, 1934–37), 10:153–54.

³⁵ In 816/1413, the *Dīwān al-Mawārīth* (the bureau of inheritances) was separated from the jurisdiction of the *Dīwān al-Wizārah* and the *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ*; henceforth heirless estates came to be delivered directly to the sultan's treasury (al-‘Aynī, *Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān*, ed. ‘Abd al-Rāziq al-Ṭanṭāwī al-Qarmūṭ [Cairo, 1985], 164; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:257; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā’ al-Ghumr*, 3:8; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 2:325). In 818/1415–16, the *nāẓir* of the sultan's treasury assumed the role of providing the *kiswah* for the Ka‘bah (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:382). In 823/1419, the *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ* was put under the jurisdiction of Marjān (Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā’ al-Ghumr*, 3:224, 238; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍaw’*, 10:153–54). The first obvious instance wherein the sultan's treasury held its own revenue source was seen in 803/1401 under Sultan Faraj. At this time, a vacant *iqṭā’* piece of land was converted into an income source of the sultan's treasury. Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 3:1067–68.

³⁶ With the assumption of the post of *nāẓir al-khizānah* under Sultan Shaykh as a beginning, Zayn al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ henceforth held many offices such as *nāẓir al-jaysh* and became the most influential civilian under the reign of Sultan Barsbāy (Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Manhal*, 7:137–39). We must discriminate between this office and the different office with the same name mentioned in the sources such as *Khīṭaṭ* and *Masālik al-Absār*, which had taken charge of the public coffers (mentioned earlier) but lost its role after the establishment of the office of *nāẓir al-khāṣṣ* (al-Maqrīzī, *Khīṭaṭ*, 3:734; al-‘Umārī, *Masālik*, 61; cf. Rabie, *Financial System*, 143–44).

³⁷ As for the Jī‘ān family, see Martel-Thoumian, *Les civils et l’administration*, 295–319.

the *khāzindār* under Sultan Shaykh indicates that this sultanic treasury became actively involved in the administration of its sources of revenue, in addition to the work of keeping the sultan's money in custody.³⁸ Under Sultan Barsbāy, who strove to accumulate private assets in various ways, the sultanic treasury acquired additional income sources, and the *khāzindār* exerted increasing influence over the government. A eunuch, Jawhar al-Qunuqbā'ī (d. 844/1440),³⁹ who served as *khāzindār* throughout Barsbāy's long reign, advised the sultan to establish a monopoly over the spice trade, in order to increase the flow of money into the sultanic treasury.⁴⁰ During Jawhar al-Qunuqbā'ī's term of office, the sultanic treasury assumed responsibility for the Mint Bureau (*Dār al-Ḍarb*), which originally belonged to the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ.⁴¹ Finally, he also assumed responsibility for *al-Dhakhīrah* and collected the money that was generated from it.⁴² He acquired an additional post, known as *zimām* (the chief-eunuch), under Sultan Jaqmaq (r. 842–57/1438–53), and he held these two posts until his death in 844/1440. Apart from the short time after his death when the sultan's private financier was appointed once again (Table 1, No. 9), the *khāzindār* serving concurrently as *zimām* continued to be in charge of *al-Dhakhīrah* and to assume the responsibility over the sultanic fisc throughout the greater part of Jaqmaq's reign.⁴³

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANIC FINANCES

As we have seen above, the meaning of the term *al-Dhakhīrah* changed over time, from “treasure,” to the sultan's sources of income—especially those relating to agricultural land during the reign of Sultan Barsbāy. However, the sultan's categorization of these properties as his “private property” gradually became obscured, as a large proportion of these properties were originally the state's property. After 844/1441 when Zayn al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Kuwayz was appointed as the sultan's private financier (Table 1, No. 9), the sources came to refer to *al-Dhakhīrah* independently, without referring to it together with *awqāf*,

³⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, 3:249–50.

³⁹ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Manhal*, 5:38–42; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, 4:167–69; al-Sakhāwī, *Daw'*, 3:82–84.

⁴⁰ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, 3:423.

⁴¹ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Nujūm*, 15:345. ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ, “Rawḍ,” 1: fol. 14v.

⁴² Al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1234; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Manhal*, 5:40; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhah*, 4:225–26; ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ, “Rawḍ,” 1: fol. 14v. I interpret *al-Dhakhīrah* here to represent the sultan's lands privately held in the various shapes as we have seen above.

⁴³ Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī, who was the *zimām-khāzindār* during the period between the reigns of Jaqmaq and al-Zāhir Khushqadam (r. 865–72/1461–67), entrusted the work of *al-Dhakhīrah*, which was within his jurisdiction, to Yūnus ibn ‘Umar ibn Jarabughā, his private *dawādār*, as its *mutakallim* (the staff in charge of the work) (al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr bi-Abnā' al-‘Aṣr* [Cairo, 1970], 467).

amlāk, or others. This is because it became the generic term for various kinds of official financial resources that were under the direct control of the sultan. In the period of Jaqmaq's reign in the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* (*bilād al-dhakhīrah*) referred to the sultanic domains, i.e., lands officially designated as the sultan's exclusive financial resources, independent of the state's finances. According to Ibn al-Jī'an's *Tuḥfah*, the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* in Egypt were composed of forty-eight districts (*nāḥiyah*) around 885/1480, under Sultan Qāyṭbāy.⁴⁴ We have no definite information about how and when this development occurred. However, in view of the fact that the vast private holdings of the sultan consisted of *amlāk*, *musta'jarāt*, and other lands that had originally been diverted from the state domains, it seems reasonable to suppose that these lands gradually came to be recognized as under the sultan's direct control and for his exclusive use. That is, as the sultan collected ever more state lands for his own use, eventually all pretence was dropped, and these lands were acknowledged as belonging to the sultan himself rather than the state.

The sultans added various kinds of land (such as *milk*, *waqf*, and *musta'jarāt*) to *al-Dhakhīrah* at opportune times to increase their income sources.⁴⁵ The *iqṭā'* land was also targeted for this purpose.⁴⁶ However, some *iqṭā'*s were occasionally granted to amirs and mamluks from the land of *al-Dhakhīrah*. The first instance of this that appears in the sources involves al-Manṣūr 'Uṭhmān, who succeeded his father Jaqmaq as the sultan in 857/1453. He granted three of the *iqṭā'*s of the amirs of ten derived from the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* to military men.⁴⁷ Henceforth, especially during the distribution of honors and reshufflings of personnel, or when the new sultan was enthroned, *iqṭā'*s were often distributed from the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁴⁸ When al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy (r. 901–4/1495–98) was enthroned after the death of his father Qāyṭbāy in 901/1495, he distributed about one thousand *iqṭā'*s to amirs and mamluks—these were all the *iqṭā'*s which had been included in the lands of *al-Dhakhīrah* under his father's reign. He did

⁴⁴ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyṭbāy," 40–41.

⁴⁵ Al-Biqā'ī, *Izhār al-ʿAsr li-Asrār Ahl al-ʿAsr* (Riyadh, 1992–93), 1:211–12, 218; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādīth*¹, 1:300–1; al-Sakhāwī, *Al-Tibr al-Masbūk fi Dhayl al-Sulūk* (Cairo, n.d.), 386; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī' al-Zuhūr fi Waqā'ī' al-Duhūr* (Wiesbaden, 1960–75), 3:13–14.

⁴⁶ In 863/1459: al-Biqā'ī, *Izhār*, 3:94. In 865/1461: *ibid.*, 3:258. In 867/1463: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādīth*², 770. In 882/1477: Badr al-Dīn Ibn al-Jī'an, *Al-Qawl al-Mustazraf fi Safr Mawlānā al-Malik al-Ashraf* (Ṭarāblus, 1984), 74–75.

⁴⁷ Al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 427–28; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādīth*¹, 1:339; *idem*, *Nujūm*, 16:29. Cf. Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtisādīyah*, 116.

⁴⁸ In 865/1461 (al-Zāhir Khushqadam's enthronement): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:258; 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ al-Ḥanafī, *Nayl al-Amal fi Dhayl al-Duwal* (Sidon and Beirut, 2002), 6:118–19; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'ī'*, 2:383. In 872/1467 (al-Zāhir Timurbughā's enthronement): Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:381. In 874/1470 (al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy's enthronement): al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 159–60.

not keep any of them in reserve.⁴⁹ Furthermore, if the sultan's power became unsettled, then he became obliged to distribute some of the land of *al-Dhakhīrah* as *iqṭāʿ*s among the troops to placate them.⁵⁰ These examples, in which *iqṭāʿ*s were included in *al-Dhakhīrah* and distributed from it, provide the basis for Poliak's interpretation of the *Dīwān al-Dhakhīrah* as a department that was responsible for managing and exploiting the vacant *iqṭāʿ*s, as is mentioned above. However, these phenomena arose from circumstances wherein on the one hand, the sultan strove to add *iqṭāʿ*s into *al-Dhakhīrah* in order to increase his financial resources, yet on the other hand he was forced to use it as a pool from which he could distribute land depending on the political situation. In short, these phenomena resulted from the competition between the sultans and other ruling elites regarding the acquisition of land and the balance of power between them. To put it another way, the strength of the sultan's power base and the relationship between the sultan and other ruling elites, such as amirs and mamluks, decided the scale of *al-Dhakhīrah*'s land and whether the sultan was able to establish a firm source of revenue.

Because of the diversification that was occurring in the land held by Circassian Mamluks, *al-Dhakhīrah*'s land included many types of land. For example, many *rizqahs* (pl. *rizaq*) were added to *al-Dhakhīrah*⁵¹ in addition to water wheels (*dūlāb*, pl. *dawālib*), which were indispensable to agriculture.⁵² Furthermore, when powerful figures who held a large amount of land in various forms, such as *iqṭāʿ*, *amlāk*, *awqāf*, *mustaʿjarāt*, and *ḥimāyah*, died or fell from power, these lands were often added to *al-Dhakhīrah*. Without returning these "leased" or "protected" lands to the governmental domain, these lands were continuously administered en bloc by an independent *nāẓir* who was newly appointed by the sultan, and the income generated from them was delivered to *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁵³ Moreover, the posts of the *nāẓirs* of various *awqāf* were often added to *al-Dhakhīrah*. For example, when two prominent amirs, Jānībak Nāʾib Juddah, the *dawādār kabīr*, and Tanam Ruṣāṣ, the

⁴⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:335; Ibn al-Shiḥnah, *Al-Badr al-Zāhir fī Nuṣrat al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy* (Beirut, 1983), 51.

⁵⁰ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:292. Cf. Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqṭiṣādīyah*, 116.

⁵¹ See note 49. *Rizqah* was the land assigned from the state land to retired amirs, widows and orphans of mamluks, religious institutions, and so on. See Poliak, *Feudalism in Egypt*, 32–34; Ito Takao, "Aufsicht und Verwaltung der Stiftungen im mamlukischen Ägypten," *Der Islam* 80 (2003): 55–61.

⁵² Al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbāʾ al-Ḥaṣr*, 442–43; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 318.

⁵³ The case of the *kātib al-sirr* (chief secretary) Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Bārīzī (in 854/1450): Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:297; al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 384. The case of the viceroy (*nāʾib al-saltānah*) of Damascus Julbān al-Muʾayyadī (in 859/1455): al-Biqāʿī, *Iḥār*, 2:93–94. The case of the *dawādār kabīr* Jānībak Nāʾib al-Juddah, the amir of a hundred (*amīr miʾah muqaddam alf*), and the *muḥtasib* Tanam Ruṣāṣ, the amir of forty (in 867/1463): Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 770.

muhtasib, were killed during a political struggle in 867/1463, their *awqāf* were added to *al-Dhakhīrah* along with their *iqṭāʿ*s and other properties.⁵⁴ The post of the *nāẓir* of Nuri hospital (*al-Bimāristān al-Nūri*) in Damascus, which had been in the hands of the Shafīʿi judge of Damascus, was also included in *al-Dhakhīrah* before 917/1511.⁵⁵ *Al-awqāf al-zimāmiyah*, i.e., the *awqāf* established by the successive *zimām-khāzindārs*, were administered by the *nāẓir al-dhakhīrah*.⁵⁶ In these cases, these *waqf* properties were not “confiscated” and transferred to *al-Dhakhīrah*; on the contrary, by keeping their status as *waqf*, the posts of their *nāẓirs*, having the authority to collect fees from the *waqf*-endowed properties and to manage their own income, were put under the control of *al-Dhakhīrah* with regard to their financial interests. These posts were not permanently included in *al-Dhakhīrah*, but were given to other people according to their specific circumstances. At this stage, we should pay attention to one case when Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy was enthroned in 901/1495. As we have seen above, as soon as he ascended to the sultanate, he allocated a large amount of *iqṭāʿ* lands that had been included in *al-Dhakhīrah* to amirs and mamluks, for the purpose of gathering support from them. At the same time, he also allocated to them the posts of the *nāẓirs* of various *awqāf* that had been included in *al-Dhakhīrah*, as they were similar to *iqṭāʿ*s.⁵⁷ This fact implies that the posts of the *nāẓirs* of *awqāf* were treated as a kind of income source, which was freely transferred among people.

The financial interests concerning commercial activities were also included in *al-Dhakhīrah*. We will begin by considering the spice trade, one of the most important income sources for the Circassian Mamluk sultans. As soon as Sultan Shaykh was enthroned in 815/1412, he started forcing Venetian merchants, who were visiting Alexandria to trade in spices, to purchase a fixed amount of spice from the sultan’s private stock at a higher price than the market price.⁵⁸ Then, Sultan Barsbāy advanced this policy and set up a spice monopoly, excluding ordinary merchants from the spice trade. Although this monopoly did not continue to work long term, this way of forcing Venetian merchants to purchase the sultan’s spices continued until the very end of the Mamluk sultanate, and the spice trade became one of the most important income sources for subsequent sultans.⁵⁹ In

⁵⁴ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 770.

⁵⁵ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh wa-al-Aqrān* (Beirut, 1999), 2:218.

⁵⁶ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 4:35, 82, 197. As for the eunuchs’ *awqāf* of the times, see C. F. Petry, “From Slaves to Benefactors: The Ḥabashīs of Mamlūk Cairo,” *Sudanic Africa* 5 (1994): 63–66.

⁵⁷ Ibn al-Shiḥnah, *Al-Badr al-Zāhir*, 52.

⁵⁸ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr*, 2:521; Eliyahu Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 276–77.

⁵⁹ As for the commercial policy of Sultan Barsbāy, see Aḥmad Darrāj, *L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbāy* (Damascus, 1961), chap. 6; John L. Meloy, “Imperial Strategy and Political Exigency: The

the late Mamluk period, after the enthronement of Sultan Qāyṭbāy, the sultan's merchants (*tājir al-sultān*), who were involved in spice dealing on behalf of the sultan, were also called "the *Dhakhīrah*'s merchants" (*tājir al-dhakhīrah al-sharīfah*).⁶⁰ Moreover, as is noted above, the term "dacchieri" (i.e., *al-Dhakhīrah*) was often used in the documents when describing the commercial agreements that were concluded between Venice and the Mamluk government. According to studies using the documentary sources, Venetian merchants who were permitted to stay in Alexandria during a fixed period of time every autumn were obliged to purchase 210 *sporte*⁶¹ of pepper from *al-Dhakhīrah* and to pay the price that had been allotted to it.⁶² The price of *al-Dhakhīrah*'s pepper was decided after a consultation undertaken between four merchants, who were appointed by the Venetian consul in Alexandria, and the staff of *al-Dhakhīrah*. This committee then discussed the matter with the *tājir al-dhakhīrah*.⁶³ In exchange, precious metals that had been brought by the Venetians were exclusively bought by *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁶⁴ In addition to these agreements, *al-Dhakhīrah* also laid claim to a part of the customs that had been levied on imported and exported goods, the additional fees that had been levied for the extension of Venetians' permitted stay in Alexandria, and the confiscated property of offenders who overstayed the period of their resident permit.⁶⁵ The *nāzīr al-dhakhīrah* stayed in Alexandria to supervise the trade during the period,⁶⁶ and the keys of the coffers in which quality-checked

Red Sea Spice Trade and the Mamluk Sultanate in the Fifteenth Century," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 123, no. 1 (2003); Eliyahu Ashtor, "Le monopole de Barsbay d'après des sources vénitienes," *Anuario de Estudios Medievales* 9 (1974–79); idem, *Levant Trade*, 277–83. As for the spice trade between the Mamluk sultanate and Italian city-states, see Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, chap. 5; Nājilā Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Nabī, *Miṣr wa-al-Bunduqīyah: al-ʿAlāqāt al-Siyāsīyah wa-al-Iqtiṣādīyah fī ʿAṣr al-Mamālīk* (Cairo, 2001), 131–34; Horii Yutaka, "The Mamlūk Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghawri (1501–16) and the Venetians in Alexandria," *Orient: The Reports of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan* 38 (2003).

⁶⁰ See Horii, "Mamlūk Sultan," 180–81. For example, the case of Muḥyī al-Dīn (or Zayn al-Dīn) ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn ʿUlaybah (d. 890/1485), the *tājir al-dhakhīrah* in Alexandria under Qāyṭbāy's reign: ʿAbd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 7:429; al-Sakhāwī, *Ḍawʿ*, 4:259–60; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ*, 3:221.

⁶¹ *Sporta* (pl. *sporte*) is a unit of mass, equivalent to 536 or 480 pounds (Wansbrough "A Mamluk Ambassador," 525, note 4). The unit "coufe" was also used (M. Reinaud, "Traité de commerce entre la république de Venise et les derniers sultans mameloucs d'Égypte, traduits de l'italien, et accompagnés d'éclaircissements," *Journal Asiatique* 4, no. 19 [1829]: 25, 27, 35, 39).

⁶² Reinaud, "Traité de commerce," 27, 33 (art. 4, 12); Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 525–26 (art. 2).

⁶³ Reinaud, "Traité de commerce," 24–25 (art. 1).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 35–36 (art. 14).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 26–27, 41, 42.

⁶⁶ Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 528 (art. 12). There was a secretary for *al-Dhakhīrah* (*kātib al-dhakhīrah*) in Alexandria regularly (Cairo, Wizārat al-Awqāf [WA], j483, v. [document

peppercorns were stored were kept by him and the Venetian consul.⁶⁷ These facts indicate that it was not only the revenues from the sultan's transactions in spice that came to be included in *al-Dhakhīrah*, but also some of taxes on commercial activities,⁶⁸ despite the fact that tax revenues collected from foreign merchants in Alexandria were originally a part of the income sources of the Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ. ⁶⁹ In addition to spice, the sultans earned a high income from commercial activities such as speculation in grain, and by participating in trade in sugar, timber, etc. The sultan's warehouses (*al-ḥawāṣil al-sultānīyah*) and the granaries (*shuwan, ahrā'*) in which these goods were stored⁷⁰ came to be called "*Ḥawāṣil al-Dhakhīrah*" and "*Shuwan al-Dhakhīrah*" in the late Mamluk period, and special staff members were appointed for their administration.⁷¹ The monthly tax (*mushāharah*) and the weekly tax (*mujāma'ah*) that were collected from the markets (*sūq*) in Cairo also contributed to the revenue of *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁷² Although the first obvious instance of a payment of these taxes to *al-Dhakhīrah* occurred in a case in 907/1502,⁷³ it is clear that merchants had been obliged to pay some taxes to *al-Dhakhīrah* regularly prior to that.⁷⁴

Incidentally, although successive sultans intervened actively in commercial activities throughout the Circassian Mamluk period,⁷⁵ the term *al-Dhakhīrah* on 15 Ramaḍān 899]).

⁶⁷ Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Ambassador," 528–29 (art. 15).

⁶⁸ In addition, "*al-Dhakhīrah's* pepper (*filfil dhakhīratnā al-sharīfah*)" was mentioned in Qāyṭbāy's letter sent to Venice in 877/1473 (Wansbrough, "A Mamluk Letter," 206, 211). These spices were procured from merchants visiting Jiddah, a Red Sea port, through various ways such as the compulsory purchase of a third of their load of spice at their buying cost in Calcutta in India (Gabriel Ferrand, "Les Poids, Mesures et Monnaies des du Sud aux XVe et XVIIe siècle," *Journal Asiatique*, série 11, tome 16 [1920]: 19). Three decrees dated in 891/1486 and 892/1487, included in the documents of the monastery of St. Catherine, mention Sultan Qāyṭbāy's orders to his staff in al-Ṭūr, a coastal port at the Red Sea, to store "*al-Dhakhīrah's* spice (*bahār al-dhakhīrah al-sharīfah*)" in warehouses (*ḥawāṣil*) (Hans Ernst, *Die mamlukischen Sultansurkunden des Sinai-Klosters* [Wiesbaden, 1960], 182, 184, 188).

⁶⁹ Al-Zāhirī, *Zubdah*, 108.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 122–23.

⁷¹ WA, j714, r. (document on 28 Jumādā II 906); al-Sakhāwī, *Wajīz al-Kalām fī al-Dhayl 'alā Duwal al-Islām* (Beirut, 1995), 971; Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, 4:413. As for the monopoly and the speculative buying, see al-Asadī, *Taysīr*, 138–46.

⁷² As for the taxes, see Jonathan Berkey, "The Muḥtasibs of Cairo under the Mamluks: Toward an Understanding of an Islamic Institution," *The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, ed. M. Winter and A. Levanoni (Leiden and Boston, 2004), 269–70.

⁷³ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 2:145. Cf. Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, 4:25.

⁷⁴ 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 8:73–74.

⁷⁵ The latest study on Barsbāy's intervention in transactions in wheat and sugar is John L. Meloy's "Economic Intervention and the Political Economy of the Mamluk State under al-Ashraf Barsbāy,"

rarely appears in the contemporary sources in relation to the sultans' commercial activities before Qāyṭbāy's reign.⁷⁶ The first instance where the term *al-Dhakhīrah* was used in this way is, to my knowledge, Ibn 'Uraybah's assumption of the office of *tājir al-sultān* and *nāzīr al-dhakhīrah* in 877/1472 under Qāyṭbāy.⁷⁷ On the contrary, *al-Matjar al-Sultānī*,⁷⁸ an office that had been in charge of the sultan's private commercial activities beforehand, is rarely mentioned in the sources after Qāyṭbāy's enthronement. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that the function and role of *al-Matjar* was included in *al-Dhakhīrah*, and that, as a result, *al-Dhakhīrah* became the generic term for all the sultan's financial resources. Moreover, the payment for the sale of governmental offices, and the confiscation of the property of officials who had died or lost their office, are usually expressed in the sources as money or property that had been "paid to the sultan's treasury." However, sometimes, especially in the sources written after the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, they are referred to as being "paid to *al-Dhakhīrah*,"⁷⁹ where the term *al-Dhakhīrah* is used in the same way as *khizānah*. It seems that the sultan's treasury was regarded as a part of *al-Dhakhīrah*. Sometimes, other financial interests belonging to the government or officials, such as the rights and interests of the Mint Bureau, were added to *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁸⁰ Moreover, *al-Dhakhīrah* had many sources of income from various regions in Syria. For instance, in Ṣafar 857/February 1453, 95,000 dinars that had been collected from *al-Dhakhīrah*'s income sources in Syria were delivered to Cairo.⁸¹ *Al-Dhakhīrah* had many financial interests, especially in the Nabulus region.⁸² Yūnus ibn 'Umar ibn Jarabughā, who was responsible for *al-Dhakhīrah* as *mutakallim* under the supervision of the *zimām-khāzindār* Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī during Jaqmaq's reign, and then officially assumed the office of *nāzīr al-dhakhīrah* at a certain time during al-Ashraf Ḥnāl's reign, took a tour of the Syrian regions and appointed a financial

MSR 9, no. 2 (2005).

⁷⁶ The sources written after the late ninth/fifteenth century mention the term "*al-Dhakhīrah*" with relation to the sultans' commercial activities in the earlier times (cf. 'Abd al-Bāsiṭ, "Rawḍ," 2: fol. 230r; idem, *Nayl*, 5:80) probably because this term was used in the new meaning given in the authors' days.

⁷⁷ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbā' al-Ḥaṣr*, 489–90. He was also referred to as *tājir al-dhakhīrah* ('Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 7:429). At the time of his death, a part of his estate was confiscated by *al-Dhakhīrah* as its share (al-Sakhāwī, *Wajīz*, 959–60, 965–66). As for him, see note 60.

⁷⁸ Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, 283.

⁷⁹ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzḥah*, 1:322, 372, 440; 3:177, 381, 398–99, 436; al-Biqā'ī, *Iḥḥār*, 2:15; Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 2:245–46.

⁸⁰ Ibn al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawādith al-Zamān*, 2:145.

⁸¹ Al-Biqā'ī, *Iḥḥār*, 1:317.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 3:241.

agent (*ustādār*) for *al-Dhakhīrah* in every region.⁸³

Al-Dhakhīrah was usually administered by the *zimām-khāzindār*,⁸⁴ but the sultans sometimes entrusted it to an independent official⁸⁵ or a powerful figure in the government.⁸⁶ This was probably to consolidate its operation. After Qāyṭbāy's enthronement and the introduction of his policies on the expansion of the sultan's fisc, the responsibility for the sultan's finances was divided among people who were of a relatively low rank in the government but who had personal connections with the sultan.⁸⁷

Ever since the sultans began accumulating land as their own private property, the main purpose in establishing the sultan's fisc had been to secure and increase independent revenue sources for the sultanate. Therefore, the income was basically distributed at the sultan's own discretion.⁸⁸ Although the specific details of its distribution are rarely mentioned in the sources, it seems reasonable to suppose that the income was used to award bonuses (*nafaqah*) for personnel involved in the ongoing military expeditions (which used to be distributed directly from the sultan's treasury),⁸⁹ for the purchase of slaves in order to organize the *mushtarawāt* (mamluks who were trained by the present ruling sultan), and for political funds to help secure and exercise his political power, etc.⁹⁰ However, under the deteriorating financial circumstances that occurred after the middle of the ninth/fifteenth century, the sultan's fisc extended its role in the administration and finance of the state; I believe that it was this that prompted the development

⁸³ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Inbāʾ al-Ḥaṣr*, 431–32, 467–68. See note 43.

⁸⁴ For example, Fayrūz al-Nūrūzī, who took the two posts of *zimām* and *khāzindār* in 846/1442 and kept them under the five sultans until his death in 865/1461 (Ibn Taghribirdī, *Nujūm*, 16:29; idem, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:340; al-Sakhāwī, *Tibr*, 428; al-Biqāʿī, *Iḡhār*, 1:300).

⁸⁵ For example, Abū al-Khayr al-Naḥḥās (d. 864/1459): al-Biqāʿī, *Iḡhār*, 3:65; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*², 326, 392; idem, *Nujūm*, 16:132, 210–11; Richard T. Mortel, "The Decline of Mamlūk Civil Bureaucracy in the Fifteenth Century: The Career of Abū l-Khayr al-Naḥḥās," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 6, no. 2 (1995).

⁸⁶ For example, Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Kātib Jakam (d. 862/1458), the *nāẓir al-jaysh wa-al-khāṣṣ* under Jaqmaq and Īnāl: al-Biqāʿī, *Iḡhār*, 1:297, 300, 350; Ibn Taghribirdī, *Ḥawādith*¹, 1:370.

⁸⁷ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyṭbāy," 42–45.

⁸⁸ Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ*, 3:453. Cf. Nāṣir, *Al-Ḥayāh al-Iqtisādīyah*, 116–17.

⁸⁹ Cf. al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzḥah*, 3:266.

⁹⁰ According to *Sulūk*, *nafaqahs* for the Royal Mamluk corps, presents (*silāt*) for amirs and Turkmens, and the expenses of the purchase of mamluk slaves and of military expeditions were referred to as "the sultan's expenditures (*nafaqāt al-sulṭān*)" paid by Sultan Jaqmaq (al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:1228–29). According to another source, the expenses of military expeditions, the purchase of mamluk slaves, arms, horses, arrows, and lancers, constructions and repairs of buildings, rewards (*inʿām*), presents, charities (*birr*), and *ṣadaqah* were derived directly from the sultan's treasury (anon. "Tārīkh al-Malik al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy," British Library MS Or 3028, fol. 15r–v).

of the sultanic fisc—the change in its character from the sultan’s private property to the official revenue sources that were directly assigned to the sultanate. Compensation for the deficits of the financial bureaus of the government, such as the *Dīwān al-Wizārah* and *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*, came from *al-Dhakhīrah*. The first instance of this can be seen in a case in *Ṣafar* 860/January 1456, under *Īnāl*. At this time, the vizier (*wazīr*; the chief of the *Dīwān al-Wizārah*) Faraj ibn al-Naḥḥāl had disappeared because of his failure, due to insufficient funds, to pay for the daily meat supplies that were required by the Royal Mamluk corps, for which the *Dīwān al-Wizārah* had responsibility. After returning, *Īnāl* requested that he stay in office on the condition that 40,000 dirhams per day were supplied to the *Dīwān al-Wizārah* from *al-Dhakhīrah*’s fund.⁹¹ As the result of further cash injections from *al-Dhakhīrah*’s fund, the amount per day reached 70,000 dirhams.⁹² The injection of *al-Dhakhīrah*’s money into *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*, which was responsible for the monthly stipends and other essentials required by the Royal Mamluk corps, had been carried out since before 863/1459.⁹³ In addition to this, in 867/1463, Sultan *al-Zāhir Khushqadam* agreed that 10,000 dinars per month would be injected from *al-Dhakhīrah*’s fund into *al-Dīwān al-Mufrad*.⁹⁴ Although this agreement was not fulfilled in the end, the injection of 8,000 dinars per month was maintained, as it had been before.⁹⁵ In 888/1484, Sultan *Qāyṭbāy* covered the deficit of the *Dīwān al-Khāṣṣ* that had been accrued by distributing sheep for sacrifice on the occasion of *‘Īd al-Aḍḥā*.⁹⁶ While previous sultans had sometimes made temporary compensation for the deficits of these financial bureaus of the government,⁹⁷ it became far more commonplace during and after the reign of *Īnāl*.⁹⁸ This shows that *al-Dhakhīrah* had become indispensable for the management of the financial bureaus, especially as financial difficulties had reached their limit by this time.

Furthermore, *al-Dhakhīrah* undertook the responsibility of paying regular salaries and stipends. For instance, around 850/1446–47, a qadi regularly

⁹¹ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith¹*, 1:492–93; ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 5:455. The next month, from the earnings from *ex-iqtā‘*s of amirs, 35,000 dirhams per day were added to the amount of money being injected into the *Dīwān al-Wizārah*. See Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith¹*, 1:494–95. Cf. ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 5:456–57.

⁹² Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith²*, 321.

⁹³ Al-Biqā‘ī, *Iḥḥār*, 3:65, 93; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith²*, 392.

⁹⁴ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith²*, 757.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 449, 477, 770.

⁹⁶ ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ, *Nayl*, 7:363.

⁹⁷ Igarashi, “Establishment and Development,” 130–31; al-Maqrīzī, *Sulūk*, 4:966; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzḥah*, 3:370; al-Biqā‘ī, *Iḥḥār*, 1:420–21.

⁹⁸ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Ḥawādith²*, 292.

received 3,000 dirhams per month from *al-Dhakhīrah*.⁹⁹ During Qāyṭbāy's reign, *al-Dhakhīrah* was responsible for granting pensions to retired amirs (*tarkhān*) and was partly responsible for providing the meat supplies to the military, civilians, and scholars during ʿĪd al-Aḏḥā. Moreover, many amirs, including some amirs of a hundred, regularly came to receive monthly stipends and wheat rations from *al-Dhakhīrah* instead of holding *iqṭāʿ*s.¹⁰⁰ Such an expansion of the role of *al-Dhakhīrah* in the spheres of administration, finance, and military affairs shows the limitations of the traditional structure of the Mamluk state, which was based on the *iqṭāʿ* system and the state's landholding. Although the various endeavors of successive sultans to reconstruct state finances throughout the Circassian Mamluk period were successful to a certain degree, they tended to lack a long-term outlook and clearly never solved the fundamental financial difficulties, i.e., the weakening of the state's control over land management and the alienation of the state land. Under these circumstances, the sultanic fisc, which covered the revenue shortage of the government's purse, gradually came to be indispensable for the smooth management of the administration. Consequently, the financial burden placed on *al-Dhakhīrah* was growing,¹⁰¹ and its financial troubles directly affected the state's finances,¹⁰² inducing the expansion of the financial resources of *al-Dhakhīrah*. Finally, especially after the succession of Qāyṭbāy, and with the state's finances becoming increasingly subordinate to the sultanic finances, the latter came to play a pivotal role in the administrative, financial, and military affairs of the Mamluk state.¹⁰³

However, it must be noted again that these phenomena occurred in parallel with the accumulation of properties by powerful amirs, who were anxious to hold onto their personal revenue sources, in addition to their *iqṭāʿ*s; they did this in various ways including holding *amlāk*, *awqāf*, *mustaʿjarāt*, *ḥimāyah*, and commercial activities, just as the sultans did. There was no essential difference between the form and character of the sultanic fisc and that of the amirs' private resources, aside from their scale. In other words, the expansion of the sultanic fisc that we have investigated in this article did not reflect a unilateral strengthening of the sultan's power, or a radical change of its character. Rather, it may be assumed that these trends were advancing in the wake of a situation wherein the ruling elite of the Mamluk state—the amirs, and the sultan as the principal among them—were personally accumulating various rights and interests and

⁹⁹ Al-Biqāʿī, *Iḏḥār*, 2:176.

¹⁰⁰ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyṭbāy," 50–51.

¹⁰¹ Al-Biqāʿī, *Iḏḥār*, 3:258.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 3:67–68.

¹⁰³ Igarashi, "The Financial Reforms of Sultan Qāyṭbāy," 39–45, 49–51.

were forming their power bases outside the framework of the traditional state structure. The evolution of the sultanic finance system and *al-Dhakhirah* resulted in the weakening of the ruling system of the government machinery; as the process developed, *al-Dhakhirah* functioned as a means of maintaining the rule of the Mamluk regime.

Table 1: Names of People Who Were Appointed the Sultan's Private Financier and the Title of Their Posts¹

Date of Appointment	Name	U/N ²	Ibn al-Furat (d. 807)	Ibn Hijji (d. 816)	al-Maqrizi (d. 845)	Ibn Qasbi Shubbah (d. 851)	Ibn Hajar (d. 852)	al-Ayni (d. 885)	Ibn Taghribirdi (d. 874)	al-Sayrafi (d. 900)	al-Sakhawi (d. 902)
1 8/16/799	'Ali' al-Din 'Ali Ibn al-Jabali	U	A/W/D [9:468]		A/W/D [3:878]	A/W/D [1:516] al-Khass [4:129]	D/A [G, 1:528; 2:172] al-Khass al-Sultani [P, 105]	D [I:448]		D [I:448]	Khass al-Sultani/D/A [D, 5252]
2 1/2/800	Farej al-Jalali	U		A/M [244]	A/D [3:928]	A/M [1:621] A/D [1:646-47; 4:1, 233]		A/D [I:457; 485]	D/A [I:298; 13:22]	A/D [1:457; 485]	A/D [D, 4:170]
3 5/2/801	Zayn al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Kuwayz	N						A/D [I:485]			
4 7/22/801	Nisr al-Din Muhammad Ibn Sa'iq	U		D/M [892]	A/W/D [3:930] D/A [3:1007]	A/W/D [4:15]	A [G, 2:44]	D/A [I:487; 2:49] D [2:98]	D/A [I:299]		Usadâr [D, 7:263]
5 9/29/801	Taj al-Din Ibn Samakh	N						A/D [I:490]			
6 12/7/807	'Ali' al-Din al-Baghdadi	U				D/A [4:416]					
7 5/7/812 7/7/816	Taqi al-Din 'Abd al-Wahhab Ibn 'Ali Shalir	U			A/W [4:110] D/A [4:268]		A/D [G, 2:432] D [G, 3:10] A/D/M/W [G, 3:110] A/D [D, 2:49]	D [I:487; 168] A/D/M/W [I:487; 278]	A/W [1:395]	D/A [2:255]	A/D/M/W [D, 5:102-3]
8 (7/7/841)	Nisr al-Din Muhammad Ibn Hसन al-Faqisi	N									al-Khass bi-Khass al-Sultani/M/D [D, 7:222]
9 8/7/844	Zayn al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Kuwayz	U			D [4:1220]		al-Khass bi-Khass al-Sultani/M/D [G, 485]	D/H [I:420] D/A [I:420]	D [1:5345]	D/A/H [4:209]	D/A [I, 45] D [D, 382]

¹ Abbreviations: A, *Amal*; D, *Dihqân*; H, *Hamayih*; M, *Mu'ayyad*; W, *Awajif*.

The sources were as follows: Ibn al-Furat: *Tarikh al-Dawlat wa-Mamluk*, vols. 7-9 (Beirut, 1936-42); Ibn Hajar: *Tarikh Ibn Hajar*, ed. Abu Yahya 'Abd Allah al-Kunduri (Beirut, 2003); al-Maqrizi: *Katib al-Saluk li-Ma'rifat Dawlat al-Mamluk* (Cairo, 1938-72); Ibn Qasbi Shubbah: *Tarikh Ibn Qasbi Shubbah* (Damascus, 1977-97); Ibn Hajar: *Inshâ' al-Ghurr al-Kharr fi Umr* (Cairo, 1969-98) (G); *Dihqân al-Durr al-Kamrah*, ed. 'Adnan Derwish (Cairo, 1992) (Dh); al-Ayni: *Iqd al-Jumân fi Tarikh AH al-Zamân* (I); ed. 'Abd al-Bâzi al-Tajâwî al-Qarnî (Cairo, 1985); (2); ed. Iman 'Umar Shamsi (entitled *Al-Sifin Barqiy*, Mir'as Dawlat al-Mamluk al-Jamâ'ah 794-807 A.H./1382-1398 A.D.) (Cairo, 2002); Ibn Taghribirdi: *Al-Nujûm al-Zâhirah fi Mamluk Misr wa-d-Qâhirah* (Cairo, 1963-72); al-Sayrafi: *Nuzhat al-Nafis wa-d-Abdân fi Tawarikh al-Zamân* (Cairo, 1970-94); al-Sakhawi: *Al-Daw al-Lamt E-AH al-Qarn al-Tas'* (Cairo, 1934-57) (D); *Al-Tibar al-Mashâh fi Dhagh al-Saluk* (Cairo, nd.) (T).

² U, *ustâdir*; N, *nizâr*.

Table 2: Private and *Waqf* Assets of the Sultans

Name of Sultan	Egypt				Syria				Total			
	Farm Land	Urban Property	Other	Total	Farm Land	Urban Property	Other	Total	Farm Land	Urban Property	Other	Total
Barqūq ¹	3 (9.1)	17 (51.5)	3 (9.1)	23 (69.7)	7 (21.2)	3 (9.1)	0	10 (30.3)	10 (30.3)	20 (60.6)	3 (9.1)	33
Shaykh ²	13 (30.2)	12 (27.9)	4 (9.3)	29 (67.4)	7 (16.3)	6 (14.0)	1 (2.3)	14 (32.6)	20 (46.5)	18 (41.9)	5 (11.6)	43
Barsbāy ³	39 (48.1)	33 (40.7)	0	72 (88.9)	2 (2.5)	7 (8.6)	0	9 (11.1)	41 (50.6)	40 (49.4)	0	81

The figures in parentheses are the percentage of total assets

¹ Waqf Deeds, Dār al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyah (DW), 9/51; Wizārat al-Awqāf (WA), j51, j67, j562, j704, j728, j736; Igarashi Daisuke, "The Private Property and *Awqāf* of the Circassian Mamluk Sultans: The Case of Barqūq," *Orient* 43 (2008): 175-76, 194-95.

² WA q938; partially edited by Fahmī 'Abd al-'Alim, *Al-'Imārah al-Islāmiyah fi 'Aṣr al-Mamālik al-Charākisah: 'Aṣr al-Sulṭān al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh* (Cairo, 2003), 113-69.

³ *Hujjat Waqf al-Ashraf Barsbāy*, ed. Aḥmad Darrāj (Cairo, 1963).