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The Return of the Punished Peoples to the Northern Caucasus and Kalmykia

SOME MEMBERS of the Caucasian peoples deported in 1943-44 began to return to their homelands as early as 1954, as we have said. They ran great risks in doing so, for such unauthorized movement was punishable by confinement in a prison or labor camp.

But there is a time for everything. And the time for repatriation had come. Neither threats nor intimidation could block or hinder this movement, these peoples' irresistible drive to return to their historic homes. Their unauthorized return hastened the adoption of official resolutions restoring the autonomy that had been abrogated.

If the Crimean Tatars had done as the Caucasians then did, had flooded back to the Crimea by the thousands, it is likely that they too would have won the restoration of their autonomous republic within the framework of the Ukrainian SSR. In this sense it seems that the Crimean Tatars missed a historic opportunity.

Not everyone managed to return to their extinguished home fires. Far from it.

At the time of repatriation it appeared that the deported peoples had been substantially depleted in number. The official statistics on this question, if they exist, are kept hidden and sealed with seven seals. However, scattered demographic data have appeared,

enabling us to make a rough estimate of the losses. We will try to present these in the form of tables. Preliminary data are provided by the censuses of 1926, 1939, and 1970; by information on the percentages of the total Soviet population constituted by the various punished peoples; and by information on the population losses suffered by the country in general as a result of the war.

Table 1

Changes in size of population of the deported peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Kalmykia (based on all-union censuses [in thousands]).

	1926	1939	1959	1970
Chechens	319	408	419	613
Kalmyks	129	134	106	137
Ingush	74	92	106	158
Karachai	55	76	81	113
Balkars	33	43	42	60

Even this table gives a general idea of the disaster that struck these peoples between 1939 and 1959. We can picture the full dimensions of this tragedy in the form of another table:

Table 2

Net losses suffered by the deported peoples between 1939 and 1959 (after allowance for wartime losses [in thousands]). 1939 = 100 percent.

	Population growth normally expected as of 1959		<i>Net losses</i>	
	<i>In absolute terms</i>	<i>In percentage terms</i>	<i>In absolute terms</i>	<i>In percentage terms</i>
Chechens	590	38	131	22
Kalmyks	142	7	22	14.8
Ingush	128	38	12	9
Karachai	124	63	37	30
Balkars	64	49	17	26.5

These figures are closer to minimal than maximal estimates.

THE RESTORATION OF THE KARACHAI AUTONOMOUS OBLAST

A month after the restoration of the Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Region, a newly-elected Soviet of Workers' Deputies of Stavropol territory convened. Of the 162 deputies, 4 were Karachai, 3 Kalmyks, and the remaining 139 Russians.¹

The composition of the population of the region had not changed significantly between the 1939 census and that of 1959.

The number of Karachai in the region had declined from 70,900 to 67,800, i.e., from 28.8 percent of the total population of the region to 24.4 percent. Russians remained the majority of the population as before—comprising 141,800 persons, or 51 percent, of the population, as compared with 119,800, or 48.7 percent, in 1939. The Cherkess population had also grown, by approximately one-third.²

In March 1957 the bureau of the Karachai-Cherkess regional committee of the party and the executive committee of the regional Soviet passed a resolution on accommodating the Karachai population on the territory of the region.³ The same year, 6,500 individual homes and 2,644 temporary living quarters were purchased and built, and 2,805 Karachai families were housed in communal apartments and temporary quarters.⁴ The arrival of about seventy-five hundred Karachai families was projected for 1958. An operational group headed by a deputy chairman of the regional executive committee traveled to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in order to carry out the population transfer in an organized way. The repatriation of the Karachai was essentially completed in 1959. Over forty-seven million rubles were allocated for housing construction and about seven million rubles for other forms of assistance. The construction of various types of cultural facilities expanded. On April 10, 1957, publication of a region-wide Karachai-language newspaper, *Kyzyl Karachai* (Red Karachai) resumed; and Karachai literature and art experienced a renaissance.⁵

RESTORATION OF THE KABARDINO-BALKAR ASSR

After the USSR Supreme Soviet passed the law on the reorganization of the Kabardinian ASSR to form the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, in February 1957, the planned resettlement of the Balkars from Kazakhstan and Kirgizia began.

On March 28, 1957, at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, the first secretary of the regional committee, T. K. Melbakhov, reported on the full rehabilitation of the Balkars and the restoration of the united autonomous republic. He warned: "The transfer of the Balkars to the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR can be carried out only in an organized way, according to a set sequence." At the same time the deputies learned that the transfer of twenty thousand Balkars, projected for 1957, was already underway. Completion of the resettlement operation was slated for 1958.

The plan was to place the returnees in three districts—Sovetskii, Elbrusskii, and Chegemskii—and in certain settlements in the lowland areas. It was expected that the Balkars would introduce socialized stock farming on a large scale in newly established *kolkhozy*.⁶

The Balkars returned to what were actually ruined areas. In an article entitled "Restore the Economy and Culture of Balkaria More Rapidly," I. Kazmakhov, the chairman of the State Planning Commission of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, openly acknowledged that after the resettlement of the Balkars in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, the areas in which they had previously lived were completely abandoned for fourteen years. "As we know," he wrote, "at present Upper and Middle Balkaria, Karasu and Bezengi, Upper Chegem and Aktoprak, Upper Baksan, Terskol, and Khabaz are almost uninhabited, and the tremendous natural resources of these areas, in particular the rich alpine meadows and hayfields, on which large-scale livestock raising was based in the past, have not been developed well at all. In this connection we face the task of developing these areas and restoring the economy and culture of all of Balkaria."⁷

The construction of homes, schools, and veterinary centers in the republic was expanded. The repatriated Balkar families were granted home-building credits of ten thousand rubles per family, repayable within three years after occupation of the new home. Credits were also allocated for the renovation of old dwellings—up to three thousand rubles, with three years to repay—and for the purchase of cows—up to fifteen hundred old rubles, the equivalent of 150 new rubles.⁸

In the years 1957–59, 9,522 Balkar families, a total of 35,982 persons, returned, of whom 14,075 were in the work force.⁹

The restoration of the rights of the Balkar people applied to the republic as a whole. On March 20, 1957, the last number of *Kabardinskaia pravda* (Kabardinian truth) appeared, to be replaced on March 22 by the first issue of *Kabardino-Balkarskaia pravda* (Kabardino-Balkar truth).

The previously existing local place names were restored: Zarechnoye (Russian for “Town across the River”) once again became Lashkuta, and the Georgian name Ialbuzi was dropped and Elbrus restored.¹⁰

The deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR wrote the following florid lines without even a sign of shame: “Nowhere have new settlers ever, in any country, enjoyed such attention or received such truly gigantic assistance from the state. Only in our country, having the highly-developed industry and powerful economy that it does, are such material and fiscal outlays to meet the needs of a newly resettled population [*pereselencheskogo naseleniya*] possible.”¹¹

And so it seems that the Balkars were simply new settlers (*pereselentsy*)!

“During the war,” Kh. I. Khutyev grimly observes, “thousands died. Among them were representatives of the Balkar intelligentsia. A substantial number died during the time the Balkars were in Central Asia. The creation of a Balkar intelligentsia was effectively cut short.”¹²

By the same token the cultural development of the Balkar people was held back because they were deprived for fourteen years

of the normal attributes of a nation, its own culture, schools, literature, and art.

At the time the repatriation of the Balkars began, in 1957, out of 5,243 persons in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR with a higher education only 74 were Balkars, and out of 6,915 with a secondary-school education only 140 were Balkars.¹³ Among these, there was not one woman. Five years later, in 1962, the number of Balkars who had received a higher education had increased 2.6 times (to 193) and those with a secondary education 3.3 times (to 466), including 247 women in both categories.¹⁴ These statistics testify not only to the rapid cultural development after repatriation but also to the colossal harm done to Balkar education in the years of deportation.

The roads of Kabardino-Balkaria are quite picturesque. Many trucks speed over them, and among the drivers are many Balkars. Glance into the cab of one of these trucks and you will see a photograph of Him. With his tender, watchful, and fatherly smile Stalin looks down upon the driver.

Truly, the ways of the Lord are mysterious!

THE KALMYK ASSR

On February 11, 1957, the USSR Supreme Soviet confirmed the law forming the Kalmyk Autonomous Region as part of Stavropol territory in the RSFSR.¹⁵ In July 1958 Kalmykia was restored to its former status as an autonomous republic.¹⁶

Thus, fourteen years after their forced deportation the Kalmyks returned to their homeland. Repatriation began at the end of 1956.

It was projected that 14,000 Kalmyk families would be resettled in Kalmykia during 1957-58. In fact, however, more than that returned, many on their own initiative, in "non-organized fashion," so to speak—15,400 families, or 32,000 persons, of whom 23,650 were of working age and ability.¹⁷

By the end of 1959 the resettlement was essentially completed. 18,158 families had returned, amounting to 72,665 persons, of whom 30,056 were capable of working.¹⁸

How were they received by the local population? On this question even the official views, or those close to the official views, differ. *The Essays in the History of the Kalmyk ASSR*, published by the Nauka [Science] Press of the Academy of Sciences in 1970, asserts, for example, that "the Russian population welcomed the Kalmyks warmly. . . ." ¹⁹

Actually, the attitude toward the repatriated Kalmyks varied. Many families who had occupied the homes of exiled Kalmyks and who had taken part of their property were eager to leave Kalmykia as quickly as possible. Others, who had been pumped full of official propaganda in the intervening years and had listened to all the stories about the "Kalmyk traitors and bandits," did not wish to live alongside such people. Others regarded them simply as alien interlopers.

Anti-Kalmyk attitudes must have been fairly widespread if such an important figure as M. A. Ponomarev, head of a party organizational section of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the RSFSR and, later, first secretary of the Kalmyk regional committee, could say at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kalmyk ASSR on October 28, 1958: "We have encountered certain individual manifestations of unhealthy relations between the newly arriving populations and those who have been living here. . . . We cannot have a situation in which teachers, agronomists, doctors, and other specialists leave our area. It is highly irregular that, in the case of *sovkhoz* no. 108 alone, some two hundred families have departed during the last two years. . . . Those Russian comrades who seek to leave the republic rather than work in harmony with the Kalmyks to rebuild the autonomous republic are acting incorrectly. . . ." ²⁰

By the end of 1958 more than fifty-five million rubles had been lent to families returning to Kalmykia for home-building, acquiring livestock, and temporary assistance. ²¹ On the average, this meant about three thousand rubles per family. Since no one has ever made an evaluation of the property the Kalmyks lost in the forced deportation, it is difficult to judge how adequate this compensation is, especially since prices for building materials, live-

stock, farm equipment, and other goods have risen sharply compared to prewar prices. The same is true of prices for personal belongings such as clothing, not to mention decorative and ornamental items.

During the first few years after repatriation there was a shortage of housing, and the situation in regard to new construction was poor. In Kaspiiskii district, for example, the new arrivals were lodged in dugouts. There were sixty-four hundred families without cows, although dairy products were the Kalmyks' main food.²²

But, as we know, living standards can be improved with time. It is a much more complicated problem to raise a people's cultural standards.

Essays in the History of the Kalmyk ASSR says: "The period spent in the Eastern parts of the country did not pass without leaving its mark. But it did not break the Kalmyks' spirit or dim their devotion to the cause of socialism and communism. . . . Naturally, the removal of the bulk of the labor force from most of the districts of Kalmykia eliminated the possibility of a rapid economic and cultural advance and to a certain extent retarded the growth of the productive forces in Kalmykia and the economic development of its natural resources. The economic and cultural development of Kalmykia suffered a certain lag in comparison with neighboring regions."²³

This quotation is indicative of much else, above all, of the attitude toward people who had suffered brutality, injustice, and lawlessness. Here they are regarded as some sort of abstraction—the labor force—the absence of which caused the economic development of the area to suffer.

But what about the offenses to their human dignity, the misery they suffered, the harsh fate of the younger generation, even if we consider only those who were from one to five years old at the time of the deportation and between fifteen and twenty years old after the repatriation? What was life like for young people who, just as they were coming of age, had to sit down at a school desk

to learn to read and write their native language? But let us proceed. The authors of the *Essays* write: "Unfortunately, in connection with the deportation of the Kalmyks to Siberia and Central Asia the *educational process* both for primary school pupils and for those in secondary and higher educational institutions was *somewhat disrupted.*" (Emphasis added.) And here are the reasons for that: "The long road of relocation, difficulties with housing, the poor knowledge of Russian of *some* [emphasis added] pupils, and other causes prevented many students from completing the school year 1943-44 successfully and only an insignificant number continued their education. . . ." ²⁴

It is hard to know what lies behind such a description of the tragedy of deportation. Is it indifference, cynicism, or something else? Everything is reduced to this: that the "educational process" was "somewhat disrupted." But weren't the lives of these schoolchildren twisted and blighted by the violence, cruelty, and indifference displayed by those who ordered them removed and shipped under guard to their places of exile?

In 1940 there were 302 schools of all types in Kalmykia, with 45,357 students. Those Kalmyks who had received a specialized secondary education or higher education numbered 1,628 within the ASSR and another 160 outside the ASSR. ²⁵

Between the time of the dissolution of the Kalmyk ASSR and its restoration the number of students was cut almost in half, the number of schools by a quarter, and the number of teachers by 16 percent. ²⁶

During the fourteen years of deportation about 450 teachers of Kalmyk nationality graduated from pedagogical institutes. ²⁷ This figure apparently includes teachers who received only a secondary-school education. The *Essays* reproduces a long list of those who completed their higher education or graduated from specialized secondary schools during the years of exile and discrimination. But a count of this list reveals only fifty-two people. ²⁸

Since the return of the Kalmyks a great deal has been done to reestablish education, cultural institutions, and health care, and to

provide for representation of the Kalmyk nationality in government and party bodies. Kalmyk literature and printing has revived, and the sciences are developing successfully.

All possible measures were taken to erase from the national memory the years of exile and arbitrary rule.

How sore a topic the special settlements are may be seen, for example, from the fact that at the anniversary session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kalmyk ASSR marking the fortieth year since the establishment of Soviet power in Kalmykia, on October 29, 1960, neither the official documents nor the welcoming speeches referred to the tragic events of the last days of December 1943. Only one of those who spoke, Kh. I. Khutuyev, secretary of the Kabardino-Balkar regional committee of the CPSU, allowed himself to make such a reference, in a form befitting the occasion: "Your holiday is our holiday. . . . The road traveled by the Kalmyk people has not always been easy. There was sorrow and sadness on its historical road. We know what storms have swept down upon the peaceful Kalmyk dwellings over the course of centuries, threatening to destroy them and to extinguish the fires of their native hearths forever."²⁹

A few years after this address, Khutuyev wrote a candidate's dissertation in which he told about the brutal and inhuman regime of the special settlements. Will this work ever be published?

RESTORATION OF THE CHECHEN-INGUSH ASSR

The greatest difficulties arose in connection with the repatriation of the Chechens and Ingush, not only because of their large numbers but also as a result of their irrepressible determination to reoccupy their ancestral homes. The situation was further complicated by the fact that after 1944 the territory they had formerly inhabited was rather heavily colonized by new settlers from other regions and republics.

The decision was made to extend the resettlement of the Chechens and Ingush over a four-year period and to carry it out by moving only small groups at a time.³⁰ An organizing committee

was established to take charge of the repatriation. It was headed by M. G. Gairbekov, later the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. But far more families kept arriving than had been planned for. This caused complications, and there were incidents resulting from housing problems and from the rapidly worsening relations between the nationalities in Grozny region and Northern Ossetia.

The return of 450 families to the city of Grozny was planned for 1957, but 2,692 arrived.³¹ In the region as a whole, forty-eight thousand families returned in 1957, but only thirty-three thousand single-apartment dwellings had been prepared. In 1957 approximately five hundred million (old) rubles were spent to meet the needs of the returnees.³² A significant portion of these funds went to establish *sovkhozy* for stock-farming.³³

Individual assistance to the returning families seems not to have been substantial by comparison with the losses suffered by the Chechens and Ingush at the time of forced resettlement. Long-term credits per family were on the order of 1,000 rubles for home building, up to 300 rubles for home renovation, and 150 rubles for the purchase of cows. In the year of their repatriation, families were relieved of taxes and obligations for the delivery of agricultural products. At the same time arrears in rent on their former residences were forgiven. Insignificant sums (up to fifty rubles) were given in the form of outright grants.

The first year of the repatriation was especially tense. In a number of districts little attention was paid to arranging work for the newcomers, and housing construction moved slowly. According to official reports, mass cultural work was in a state of neglect.³⁴ Local leaders were especially concerned by the "inadequate propaganda work on the subject of friendship among the peoples." In mid-July 1957 the regional committee and the organization committee adopted a special resolution in connection with the unsatisfactory provision of housing for the repatriates.³⁵

It was difficult to normalize relations between Chechens and Ingush, on the one hand, and those who had occupied their land, on the other. The return of the Chechens and Ingush was, to put it

mildly, not greeted with special enthusiasm by the local population.

For example, in Mezhdurechenskii (now Shalinskii) district, of the four hundred families (with 669 able-bodied members) which had arrived by February 1, 1957, only ten had been accepted in *kolkhozy* and only twenty-one were provided with jobs at factories and offices.³⁶

But energetic measures were taken "to exert ideological influence" on the repatriates. In the second half of July 1957 a republic-wide newspaper, *Leninskii put'* (The Leninist path) began to appear in Chechen and a similar newspaper in Ingush, *Svet* (Light). In rural areas lectures were given and meetings held on the theme of friendship among the peoples; these involved more than ten thousand people.³⁷ Selection and advancement of new cadres from among the Chechens and Ingush also proceeded.

On August 12, 1957, the sixth plenum of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee of the CPSU was held, at which a report was given by A. I. Yakovlev, first secretary of the committee, on the implementation of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee of November 24, 1956, on the restoration of the national autonomy of the Chechen and Ingush peoples. P. N. Pospelov, a secretary of the Central Committee, arrived in Grozny to explain to local personnel the tasks flowing from the restoration of the autonomous areas dissolved in 1943-44. Pospelov visited a number of districts where he spoke at public meetings. His visit was obviously connected with the worsening relations between the nationalities in the Caucasus. At the plenum there was a sharp exchange which, of course, was not reported in the press at the time but which has become known thanks to the later work of Dzhuguryants.³⁸

Dzhuguryants, with a stenographic text of the sixth plenum of the regional committee at his disposal, described the incident as follows: "D. Malsagov, a member of the organizing committee, on the basis of isolated and episodic instances of incorrect attitudes toward the Chechens and Ingush, tried to imply that the leading party body of the republic held attitudes of the same kind. In regard to this speech P. N. Pospelov said that a wrong note had

been sounded which was not conducive to friendship among the peoples. Also profoundly in error was a statement by another member of the organizing committee, Tangiyev, who called for reversal of the decision to transfer Prigorodnyi district to the Northern Ossetian ASSR."³⁹

There is no question that the poor relations between nationalities in Chechnia was one manifestation of the general crisis in the realm of nationalities policy, which was an essential part of the overall crisis of the Stalinist system, a crisis which began at the end of World War II and intensified in the first several years after the war.

At the time of the return of the Chechens and Ingush to the territory of Grozny region, over 540,000 inhabitants lived there already. During the next four years it was projected that the repatriation would add another 500,000. As early as April 1957 a number of settlers of Caucasian nationality—Avars, Dargins, Ossetians—who realized quite well what it meant to arbitrarily settle on the lands of one's neighbors and to take over their homes—appealed to the authorities to transfer them to Dagestan and Northern Ossetia, from whence they had come in 1944. There were seventy-seven thousand of these.⁴⁰

Chechens from Dagestan (Aukhovtsy) also returned there. But their former settlements had been occupied by Laks, and a new district, Novolakskii (New Lak), had been formed. The Aukhovtsy settled on the lands of the Kumyks, a small nationality. Neither group objected.

Things were much more complicated in the case of the Ingush who returned to Northern Ossetia. When the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was restored, the decision was made to leave Prigorodnyi district as part of Northern Ossetia, since it bordered on the capital of the Northern Ossetian ASSR, Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladikavkaz), on three sides.

In order to understand this problem better, we should look at the past history of the city for a moment.

Vladikavkaz had been founded on the right bank of the Terek on the site of three Ingush villages, the largest of which was the

village of Zaur. On the left bank lived Ossetians. In the late eighteenth century Russian military authorities brought Ossetians who had been living in the mountains down to enlarge the garrison of Vladikavkaz. Early in the nineteenth century a fort was reestablished at the entrance to the Daryal gorge, and the Ossetians returned to their former homes. Later they were moved again, and this time they settled not far from Vladikavkaz, at Olginskaya. Under Soviet rule Vladikavkaz became the capital of the Mountaineer Republic. At the end of 1928 Stalin proposed that Ingush territory be joined to Ossetia, but the Ingush succeeded in demonstrating the inappropriateness of this idea. In 1932 Vladikavkaz was transferred to Ossetia. Half the Ingush population lived in the suburban settlement of Angushit, eight kilometers from the city.

The Ingush who had returned from deportation expressed their willingness to buy back from the new owners the homes that had belonged to them before their expulsion,* but the Ossetian authorities advised the local inhabitants not to sell. The Ingush were discriminated against in jobs and schools. But nothing could crush their determination to settle in their former home territory.

Unable to oppose the Chechens and Ingush in their powerful drive to recoccupy the places where they had lived before 1944, the authorities were compelled, "in order to facilitate and speed up the accommodation" of the Chechens and Ingush, to relocate 2,574 families, mostly Russian, to areas on the other side of the Terek.⁴¹ They did this unwillingly because they wanted to avoid the spread of false rumors to the effect that the Chechens were driving out Russians. Nevertheless, according to data from the archives cited by Dzhuguryants in his dissertation, thirty-six thousand members of the Russian population did leave Checheno-Ingushetia on their own initiative.⁴²

In the same work Dzhuguryants tells of the hostile and chauvinist attitudes toward the returning Chechens and Ingush held by a

* After the deportation of the Chechens and Ingush, their homes, with the exception of the villages in the mountains, which were blown up or knocked down, became objects of speculation, changing owners fifteen to twenty times.

certain section of the Russian population. "Individual party members," he writes, "took anti-party positions on the national question, tried to argue that it was impossible for the Russian and Chechen-Ingush populations to live side by side on the territory of the republic, and adopted a negative attitude toward the restoration of autonomy."⁴³

It so happened that in the forefront of those who abandoned Checheno-Ingushetia there were Communists. Among them were leading party and government personnel, agricultural specialists, doctors, and teachers. They did this against the instructions of higher party bodies. For example, in Shalinskii district more than three hundred party members were stricken from the books during 1957.⁴⁴

The further course of events showed that the incorporation of Prigorodnyi district into Northern Ossetia was a mistake and a source of dissatisfaction for the Ingush that has not ceased to rankle to this very day. At the time of the mass repatriation of the Chechens and Ingush in 1958 the situation was so tense that any incident at all could provoke a severe outbreak of trouble between the nationalities.

One such conflict erupted in Grozny on August 24, 1958. The immediate cause had nothing to do with politics—a Russian sailor on leave asked a young woman to dance, and an Ingush who had designs on her intervened. A fight began in which the sailor was killed. On the next day the sailor's funeral turned into a bloody mob action by the Russian population. The disturbances lasted four days, one of the worst racial clashes in the Soviet Union since the end of the war.

The crowd following the coffin to the cemetery consisted entirely of Russians. They marched up to the building housing the regional committee and demanded that the local party leadership and the government of Checheno-Ingushetia hold a memorial meeting. An attempt was made to carry the coffin into the party building. However, police who had arrived formed a line and no one was allowed to enter the party building. A truck with a public-address system appeared from somewhere and some dark-haired

fellow began the rally. Meanwhile the crowd swept the police out of the way and burst into the party building. Two secretaries of the regional committee and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (all Russians) appeared on the truck and said a few words. The city's Lenin Plaza, where these events took place, was crowded to overflowing. According to eyewitnesses, there must have been ten thousand people.

Some speakers called on people to join the strike that had allegedly been announced by the workers at the largest petrochemical plant in Grozny. A representative from the plant was given the floor. But when he told the crowd they were being wrongly informed and that the workers at the plant were not on strike, he was struck and knocked from the truck. Workers in the crowd, however, protected him from further reprisals.

Then a woman appeared on the platform of the truck. Declaring that she had formerly served in the regional committee and the Council of Ministers, she proposed a resolution with the following demands: 1) expulsion of the Chechens and Ingush; 2) mass search of all Chechens and Ingush, any found with weapons in their possession to be shot on the spot; 3) establishment of Russian power. The woman urged the crowd to go to the railway station, stop trains passing through, and tell the passengers that in Grozny the Chechens were attacking all Russians with knives.

Handwritten leaflets in block lettering were thrown from the windows of the regional committee building. Here are the approximate contents of one:

Comrades, brothers, Russian people!
 Follow the example of the peoples of Jordan and Iraq.
 Rise up and fight for the Russian cause!
 Demand the expulsion of the Chechens and Ingush!
 Read this and pass it on.
 If you don't agree, tear it up.

People's Defense Committee.*

*The text of this leaflet has been reconstructed by the author. D. Malsagov, the member of the organizing committee mentioned above, immediately took a train

An empty bus drove by. In it were only the driver and the conductor. The driver stopped the bus, climbed up on the roof, and began to shout, appealing to the aroused mob. "The Chechens fired a volley at my bus. They killed a man and a woman, a young woman—they cut off her hands." (Actually, several pogromists had broken into the telegraph building. The chief of the guard in the building, a lieutenant, fired a shot after giving a warning, and wounded someone. The bus had passed by then and the driver had seen someone lying on the ground. His overheated imagination created all the rest.)

The crowd roared. An elderly man with plainly Caucasian features, wearing an astrakhan hat, was standing nearby on the sidewalk. He was seized and savagely beaten right in front of the soldiers guarding the government building. The soldiers simply looked on, without moving. The man was killed before their eyes. It was later found that he was a peddler from the village of Urus-Martan.

The Russian public, including Communists as well, pinned on red ribbons so that the rampaging pogromists would not take them for Chechens or Ingush. (How similar all this was to the pogroms

for Moscow to inform the Central Committee of the events in Grozny. While the train was stopping in Kharkov he saw a woman reading this leaflet out loud. Malsagov jumped out just as the train was leaving, snatched the leaflet from her, and took it to Moscow. There, through a certain R., he tried to submit the leaflet to the Party Control Commission, but R. did not deliver the leaflet. On May 8, 1959, Malsagov was expelled from the party and arrested. He was accused of anti-Soviet activity, of inciting racial animosity and slandering the Russian, Chechen, and Ingush peoples and the leading party and government personnel of the republic. He was also accused of dictating the text of this leaflet to his cousin. R. appeared as a witness for the prosecution. There was another "witness" as well, who later wrote a statement repudiating the testimony given against Malsagov. The court found Malsagov guilty and sent him to a labor camp at Potma, where he served five years. A protest by the deputy general procurator of the USSR was attached to the sentence, but subsequently the protest was withdrawn without any explanation. Malsagov was not restored to membership in the party. At the present time he works as an agronomist with the Ministry of Agriculture of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. People who know Malsagov well insist that the case against him was a total frame-up.

against the Jews in tsarist Russia, except that then red ribbons were not worn.)

The Chechen population displayed exceptional restraint and did not respond to the pogromists' provocations. On the third day of the disorders in Grozny, looting began. Troops began to arrive. Gradually order was restored.

The chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Yasnov, arrived from Moscow, along with General Pliyev, and N. G. Ignatov, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The writer Khalid Oshayev, who had found a stack of leaflets of a pogromist character, tried to get an appointment with Ignatov in order to give him the leaflets, but Ignatov traveled off into the outlying districts and did not receive Oshayev.

None of the pogromists were brought before the law for the disorders of August 1958 in Grozny, not even those who stood on the truck platform and incited the crowd to violence.

A year later, A. I. Yakovlev, first secretary of the regional committee, was transferred to the post of inspector in the Central Committee apparatus in Moscow.

The 1958 disturbances helped to trigger smaller clashes. The regional committee bureau tried to normalize national relations somehow; it promoted local cadres and punished chauvinistic Russian leaders. In particular, R. K. Donskoi, first secretary of the Shalinskii district committee of the party, was reprimanded for negligence in mass political work, and the chairman of the Shalinskii district executive committee was removed from his post.⁴⁵ A number of Russian party members who had openly spoken out against the restoration of Chechen-Ingush autonomy were expelled from the CPSU. On the other hand, "manifestations of national hatred" on the part of Chechen-Ingush party personnel were much more severely punished.

A reflection of the deterioration in relations between the nationalities may be seen in an article by V. Sklokin, deputy head of the party organizational section of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee. He wrote: "The party organizations must be especially insistent in combating the serious shortcomings that have

appeared in the course of the restoration of the national autonomy of the Chechen and Ingush peoples. It is necessary to intensify the education of the population in the spirit of the Leninist nationalities policy and of fraternal friendship among the peoples of our country, and to take more rapid measures to make arrangements for the Chechens and Ingush arriving in the republic in regard to jobs and domestic needs."⁴⁶

But, as subsequent events showed, the deportation of 1944 had a profound psychological effect not only on the Chechens and Ingush but also on the Russian and Ukrainian population of the area. Its negative consequences continue even today. In 1958 the writer A. E. Kosterin sent a letter to the CPSU Central Committee in which he cited instances of incorrect attitudes towards the repatriated Chechens and Ingush on the part of leading local party and government personnel. In particular, his letter referred to the mistaken decision to attach Prigorodnyi district to Northern Ossetia. Kosterin's letter circulated widely and had a big impact in Checheno-Ingushetia. The bureau of the party regional committee gave special consideration to this question and in a resolution of April 28, 1958, condemned Kosterin for his letter. The bureau asserted that the letter sowed discord and tended to inflame national hatred.⁴⁷

Not only did the enforced exile of the Chechens and Ingush bring to a halt the struggle for atheism, reverse the decline in religious fanaticism, and preserve the influence of the Islamic religion and sects, it considerably strengthened the influence of religion. And what, after all, could the deported peoples turn to, if not religion? Certainly the authorities had left them in the position of pariahs. Cultural and educational work came to a complete stop—there were no newspapers, no books, and no motion pictures in the native language. All this created exceptionally favorable conditions for the increased influence of religion, an influence which historically had been to a certain extent both anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.

To this the authorities now added an exceptionally provocative measure, one which had deep social and political implications. In

1957 there began the systematic liquidation of the last *khutor* settlements of the Chechens, a process which was expected to take several years, lasting until 1963.⁴⁸ This measure may be regarded with some justification from the historical point of view as the completion of the "conquest of the Caucasus" begun 150 years earlier, allowing, of course, for the changes in the overall situation in the intervening years, the political shifts, and the radical transformation of the social structure of Russia (the Soviet Union) and the Caucasus.

On the other hand, a more concerted effort was begun to draw Chechens and Ingush into industrial production. This had a significant effect on the growth of the urban population and drew a part of the native population away from the traditions of its centuries-old way of life. Great harm was done to these people's cultural development. Even from certain fragmentary and far from complete statistics, officially published at different times, one can make an informed judgment on this question.

Of the 8,997 specialists with higher education listed in Checheno-Ingushetia in 1959, only 177 were Chechens and 124 Ingush. In the same year the number of people with a secondary school education was 14,150, of whom 403 were Chechens and 248 Ingush.⁴⁹

The secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee, A. I. Yakovlev, observed in one of his speeches in 1958 that as of January 1, 1958, approximately eight thousand Chechen and Ingush children aged eight to fifteen were not attending school. This amounted to 18 percent of the total number of schoolchildren in that age group. "The problem of introducing universal education," he stated, "is the problem of raising the cultural level of the Chechen and Ingush peoples further, rapidly overcoming harmful domestic and tribal survivals of the past, and involving all young people in active social and political life."⁵⁰ Z. S. Dudnik, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR from the Alkhan-Kalinskii election district in Grozny, commented that in a number of places children were being taught in unsuitable buildings and that there were some who did not attend school at

all.⁵¹ R. I. Umayeva, a teacher and deputy from the Staro-Atachinskii election district of Urus-Martan district, said: "It hurts me very much when I think of the fact that we still do not have enough native teachers. For example, in Urus-Martan district there are only three teachers, young women. We still have too few rural personnel who know their jobs well."⁵²

"In the period from 1944 to 1953," writes Dzhuguryants, "the Chechen and Ingush youth had extremely limited opportunities for entry into higher educational institutions and specialized secondary schools. This had a negative effect on the training of specialists from the ranks of Chechens and Ingush."⁵³ Of 8,000 teachers working in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR after its restoration, only 1,440 were Chechens and Ingush, and of these a mere 190 had higher educational degrees.⁵⁴ Moreover, according to the 1959 census the percentage of Chechens and Ingush in the population of the republic as a whole, although it had shrunk considerably by comparison with 1939 (when it was 58.4), constituted 41.1 percent.⁵⁵

Rapid and energetic measures were taken. By 1957 there were 133 Chechens and Ingush studying at the pedagogical institute, 30 at the petroleum technical school, and 145 at the pedagogical school (on the secondary level).⁵⁶

Even in the first years after repatriation, part of the Muslim clergy tried to turn the national sensibilities of the Chechens and Ingush in an anti-Russian direction. In a number of settlements teachers and medical personnel began to be harassed, and the local leaders in some districts—Vasilkov in Urus-Martan, and Krutov in Achkhoi-Martan—were inclined to regard this merely as an expression of hooliganism.⁵⁷

The past, and the popular psychology connected with it, at some points in history proves to be more important than considerations of economic expediency. The fact remains that in spite of the enlargement of the territory of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR after the restoration of autonomy—three districts of Stavropol territory (Kargalinskii, Naurskii, and Shelkovskii) having been added to the republic, together constituting 27 percent of the en-

ture territory of the ASSR (5,200 square kilometers out of a total of 19,300)—in spite of this the Ingush stubbornly continued to insist on the return of Prigorodnyi district, a territory of only 977.5 square kilometers.⁵⁸

Fifteen years after the restoration of autonomy, on February 23, 1973, the anniversary of the dissolution of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1944, a group of Ingush came to Grozny in organized fashion to demand that the authorities have Prigorodnyi district returned. This new sharpening of tensions was undoubtedly related to the discrimination against the Ingush, especially in regard to jobs, in Northern Ossetia, to which Prigorodny district now belongs.

A seventy-five-page appeal, signed by several thousand Ingush, lists cases of mistreatment and discrimination against Ingush living in Northern Ossetia. Among these are refusal to hire Ingush who live not in Ordzhonikidze but in nearby settlements, while at the same time non-Ingush people from villages twenty kilometers from the city are driven to work. The petition refers to restrictions in choosing a place of residence, refusal of permission to build or buy homes, and other forms of discrimination. For example, in one of the schools attended by Ingush children, the director, an Ossetian, supposedly sent a group of eighty children to a Pioneer camp, but in fact placed them in a boarding school for retarded children. Only after a year did the parents succeed, through great efforts, in having their children returned.

The Ingush requested that they be allowed to live where they wished, to buy homes and to build them, and, lastly, that they be allowed to establish their own cemetery. They stated that they were not seeking a change in the administrative status of Prigorodny district but asking only to be assured the same rights as other citizens of Northern Ossetia.

Ingush who lived in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR demonstrated in support of these demands. Demonstrations were held in Grozny over a period of several days. The demonstrators carried portraits of Lenin and Brezhnev and slogans with statements by these leaders on internationalism and friendship among the peoples. A

big rally was held without interruption. One speaker followed another. There were no speeches of an anti-Soviet nature. The demonstrators organized their own marshal squad to prevent disorders. According to one account, the leaders of the republic, who had sent to Moscow in dismay for advice on what to do, received the vague but wise reply, "Do what you wish, but in no case use force."

Several highly-placed personages arrived in Grozny, headed by the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Solomentsev. The events ended with buses being brought up, each with a sign bearing the name of a particular village. The demonstrators were advised to board the buses and return to their various homes. They were given assurances that no repression would follow. But several hundred, mostly young people, remained. Groups of firemen with hoses and police with clubs were turned loose on them.

The demonstration of February 23, 1973, was the biggest action by the Ingush since their repatriation. It showed once again that as long as the wrong that had been done was not completely corrected, it would repeatedly generate conflicts. There are constant smaller clashes, disputes, and expressions of dissatisfaction, but these do not become widely known or gain public attention.

True to the custom in the Soviet Union, the newspapers did not report the events of February 23, 1973. Only a few scattered articles filtered through and appeared on the pages of *Groznenskii rabochii* somewhat later on. However, these not only make it possible to infer the nature and scope of the events but also help us to understand the substance of relations between nationalities in Checheno-Ingushetia at the present time.

In mid-March 1973, articles, groups of news items, and other material directly and indirectly related to the Ingush movement for the return of Prigorodnyi district began to be published systematically in the pages of *Groznenskii rabochii*.

From these materials it became clear that a group of intellectuals and party workers formerly holding responsible posts, all of Ingush nationality, were taking part in this movement (and possibly providing its leadership). Among them were the popular

Ingush writer Idris Bazorkin; A. Gazdiyev, former secretary of the Nazran district committee of the party (Nazran is the center of Ingushetia) and subsequently deputy minister of culture of the republic; S. Pliyev, former chairman of the Sunzhenskii district executive committee; and the distillery director D. Kartoyev.⁵⁹ One of the participants in this movement, incidentally, was a graduate student at the Institute of History of the USSR under the USSR Academy of Sciences by the name of Parov. He was withdrawn from graduate work in the wake of these events.

Judging by the speech of S. S. Apriatkin, first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee of the party, at the tenth plenum of the committee, on March 27, 1973, the movement not only involved Nazran and Sunzhenskii districts; participants also came into Grozny city from Malgobek and Shalinskii districts and the rural part of Grozny district.⁶⁰

After the plenum there was an extensive campaign against nationalism and religious influences upon the population. A series of gatherings dealt with these problems: the eleventh plenum of the Grozny municipal committee of the party, in April 1973; a meeting of all active party members in the republic, in late May the same year; the twelfth plenum of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee, on July 31, 1973; and the thirteenth plenum of the same organization, in November of that year.

The leadership of the republic was especially disturbed by the broad participation of young people in the events of February 23 and after. S. S. Apriatkin complained, at the plenum of the regional committee on March 27, 1973, for example, that in the above-mentioned districts mass political work had been poorly handled and had not reached a substantial section of the population, "especially young people, women, and the elderly."⁶¹ A resolution of this plenum also stated: "In the towns and districts of the republic there are quite a few young men and women who do not work anywhere and are not going to school. Right in front of the eyes of Communists and Komsomol personnel, these young people pursue an improper and, in some cases, openly antisocial way of life."⁶² Here, too, attention was called to the fact that

some students graduate from higher educational institutions without having been "tempered ideologically."⁶³ At the second republic-wide methodology conference of Komsomol propagandists, held in Grozny in early June 1973, it was stated: "Certain politically and morally unstable young people, who have come under the influence of bourgeois propaganda and of adherents of reactionary survivals of the past, express themselves in a politically harmful way and distort the state of affairs in the republic. . . . Some young people from Sunzhenskii district have given vent to expressions of nationalism. The tractor drivers Alkhoyev and Khomatkhanov, on the Akhlangurskii *sovkhos*, were expelled from the Komsomol."⁶⁴ Another young man, by the name of Arsamakov, a former secretary in the Komsomol organization of the Malgobek truck-and-tractor column, was also expelled from the Komsomol for "lack of political principle."

What were the reasons for the worsening relations between the nationalities in Checheno-Ingushetia, in the view of the party leaders of the republic? (This question pertains not only to the views of the local leaders, it would seem, for a deputy chief of the propaganda department of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. A. Sklarov, spoke at the tenth plenum of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee.)

Their reasons were, first, the persistence and active influence of clan ties on social life. This was to no little extent the result of an underestimation—to use the words of the first secretary of the regional committee, S. S. Apriatkin—of the national peculiarities and the specifics of the historical development of the native population. He had to admit that the survivals of the clan system (the *teipa*) persist to this day, survivals which have an enormous influence on cadre policies too. The chairman of the KGB of Checheno-Ingushetia, V. I. Zhigalov, and the secretary of the regional committee, M. A. Kerimov, spoke at the plenum about the practice of promoting incompetent cadres and cynically transferring unsuccessful officials from one location to another. This cadre problem is what we would call a universal phenomenon, not something found only in Checheno-Ingushetia. The measures

suggested for "correcting" this problem were to put a decisive stop to all attempts to "select cadres by kinship (*teipa*) ties" and to purge individuals "given to national prejudice and behaving in a two-faced manner."⁶⁵

The second reason noted was the profound influence of Islam on a substantial portion of the population. Numerous Muslim sects and smaller sectarian groups exist and function in the republic. (By the unofficial count of the Georgian historian L. there are about 150.) According to S. S. Apriatkin, the sects encourage nationalist attitudes. In his words, the Kunta-Hajji sect in Shalinskii district called for a struggle against the "Russification" of the Chechen-Ingush youth.⁶⁶ At a conference at the Council of Ministers of the ASSR in April 1973 reference was made to the custom of pilgrimages to numerous "holy" places as a factor that intensifies religious fanaticism.⁶⁷

Murid religious groups have "modernized" their activity and use the latest technology to illegally broadcast material with a religious content (this is severely punished under the law). Phonograph records and recorded tapes with religious content are also produced and circulated.⁶⁸ The extent to which religion influences the everyday life of the native population of the ASSR was discussed in a letter to the editors of *Groznenskii rabochii* signed by a group of young party and Komsomol workers—Yu. Aidayev, D. Akhriyev, B. Buzurtanov, M. Vedziyazhev, A. Karatayev, S. Sanguriyev, and M. Tochiyev. It was published with the heading "To Serve the People with Honor." It said: "A substantial part of the population is under the influence of religion. Murid communities of various persuasions, which are active in the republic, try to control the morals and customs, domestic and family relations, marital ties, and other relationships, and to strengthen their pernicious influence upon the youth."⁶⁹

To judge from the pages of *Groznenskii rabochii*, the Muslim clergy seem to have become a kind of "shadow state" within a state. With its blessings, participation, and leadership, secret *khel* courts function quite actively; the customs of *kalym* (bride-money) and abduction of the bride from her parents flourish; and a cult is

made of the traditions of blood revenge, mutual protection, etc.⁷⁰ At the tenth plenum of the regional committee, S. S. Apriatkin told of an especially curious case in which a *khel* court was counterposed to a people's court. In Nazran district the people's court brought a group of people to trial on charges of stealing grain from a *sovkhoz*. Later a *khel* court convened secretly and ruled that those who had testified in this case before the people's court should be fined seven thousand four hundred rubles—to go to the defendants!⁷¹

However, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that the leaders of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR may be exaggerating the extent of the Muslim clergy's influence in order to cover up for their own inability to handle national problems and the fruitlessness of their attempts at solving these problems in concrete cases. Are they trying to exculpate themselves in the eyes of Moscow in this way?

The third official thesis is that there is a breeding ground for nationalist agitation in the "non-class approach to the evaluation of historical phenomena, the idealization of the past, the exaggeration of the merits of certain individuals out of all proportion, and the attempts to portray the Chechens and Ingush as peoples who had no class differentiation and never knew the class struggle."⁷²

These points were later refined and enlarged upon in speeches by party leaders and, after them, by historians. Their main concern was to emphasize the positive aspects of tsarist policies in the Caucasus. M. O. Buzurtanov, a secretary of the regional committee, has stated quite seriously that the progressive significance of the unification of Checheno-Ingushetia with Russia was that otherwise it would not now be a socialist nation! Praising the exploits of General Yermolov, the strangler of the Caucasian peoples, Buzurtanov criticized writers and historians of Checheno-Ingushetia for their "one-sided treatment" of Yermolov's "founding of the fort of Grozny" and for failing to mention the importance of the fort "as part of the overall system of fortifications guarding against the danger that the peoples of the Caucasus, including the Chechens and Ingush, might be enslaved by the Turkish and Persian conquerors and the Anglo-French colonia-

lists."⁷³ Such unscientific pronouncements had not been heard for twenty-five years, not since the great-power chauvinist campaign against "cosmopolitanism."

K. Yefanov, a historian of the CPSU, spoke in the same vein as Buzurtanov. Not only did he repeat, without any solid scientific arguments, the thesis that there was class differentiation in Chechen-Ingush society and an intense class struggle, anathematizing all historical works that either denied this thesis or raised doubts about it; he also asserted that the popular movements in the Caucasus in the 1860s and 1870s had been provoked by Turkish agents in the interests of Turkey and Iran!⁷⁴

These and other similar statements are undoubtedly symptomatic of intensified Great Russian chauvinism in Checheno-Ingushetia. But at the same time, these statements testify to the dead end in which the leaders of the autonomous republic find themselves because they have pursued policies in the area of national relations that have been completely stereotyped and lacking in any perspective.

The official point of view contends, further, that it is necessary to wage a determined struggle against attempts to cover up "negative processes," and not to hide the historical truth from the people, especially the youth. This historical truth allegedly consists in the fact that during the struggle for Soviet power and during the Second World War, class enemies organized in outlaw bands helped the enemies of the Soviet state and that the Soviet military command was forced to use front-line units of the Red Army to combat these bands.⁷⁵

In May 1974 *Groznenskii rabochii* published a major article by V. I. Filkin headlined "Hopes Built on Sand: For an Objective Treatment of the History of Checheno-Ingushetia During the Great Patriotic War." This article attempted to explain the complexity of the political situation in the region during the war. But it had a number of weaknesses. It gave no statistics on the number of people drawn into "political banditry" (a term Filkin introduced in place of the previously used term, just plain "banditry"). It failed to discuss the question of participation by Northern

Caucasians in Hitler's military formations. And its attempt to describe the various positions of the different social layers during the war was too general and therefore unconvincing.⁷⁶

The events of February 1973 supposedly revealed the existence of a great disparity: although the native population had acquired the material benefits of civilization, its need for cultural refinement had not been met. In the old days, on religious holidays, the Mountaineers used to prance about on horses decorated with yellow pennants. Now they decorate their Moskvich and Zhiguli automobiles. At the same time there are frequent reports from a number of districts that doctors, teachers, and members of other professions are harassed if they are not of the native nationality. For example, D. Banashev, deputy minister of internal affairs for the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, has written about such cases in Malgobek, Shalinskii, Nazran, and Nozhai-Yurtov districts.⁷⁷ A case was reported in the press in which specialists at the knitting mill who were not natives were harassed in Nazran in early 1973.⁷⁸

Once again, however, we must ask: Why hasn't the press referred, at least after February 1973, to negative facts of the opposite kind, expressions of Great Russian chauvinism toward the Chechens and Ingush? Are there really no such cases? Don't the reports about hostility toward individuals who are not of the native nationality serve as justification for great-power chauvinism? It should be remembered that at the present time, according to the 1970 census, the Russian population in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR constitutes 34.5 percent, and the Chechen and Ingush 58.5 percent.⁷⁹ With this kind of population balance, the proper handling of the delicate instrument of nationalities policy requires special art. There are enough intelligent people in Checheno-Ingushetia to provide this skill, however. It should be noted that, in addition to calls for a struggle against nationalism, appeals for restraint have also been heard. A lecturer at the Grozny Petroleum Institute by the name of Ovcharov rightly condemned the tendency for "certain individuals" to make wholesale condemnations of an entire people because of the actions of a few "rene-

gades." Ovcharov urged that "such tendencies be firmly stopped and that philistine nonsense be refuted objectively by dealing consistently with the historical truth, without going to extremes in one direction or another."⁸⁰

In November 1973, at the thirteenth plenum of the Chechen-Ingush regional committee, first secretary S. S. Apriatkin declared that "the party organizations in the republic have succeeded in exposing the bankruptcy and harmfulness of the nationalist demands concerning Prigorodnyi district . . . and in exposing the organizers of the antisocial nationalist demonstration, showing that their actions were not in the interests of the people, but, on the contrary, were detrimental to its vital interests and aspirations. . . ."⁸¹

After this the plenum concentrated its attention on the fact that after the tenth plenum many scientists and scholars, especially of Chechen and Ingush nationality, had failed to speak up either orally or in writing. It was also revealed that during the assemblies held in all inhabited areas of the republic and at party, working-class, and Komsomol meetings, there had been "undesirable contributions." The plenum concluded that "the pathetic handful of nationalist elements had altered their tactics," and it called for a "strictly political response to the attempts to smuggle in harmful notions under the pretext of freedom of discussion."⁸² It is evident that discussion had gone beyond the permitted bounds and that certain orders had been handed down accordingly.

After the events of February 23 the main effort in ideological work among the native population was to combat the cult of "the land of our forefathers," i.e., the historical claims of the Ingush to Prigorodnyi district. The results of this campaign were disappointing. At a plenum of the regional committee in June 1974 it was stated that too little had been done to deglamorize the "cult of the land of our forebears."⁸³ But looked at more generally, within the context of the present time in history, the idea that the Ingush could be persuaded to abandon their claim to their historic homeland seems highly dubious.

Notes

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The Punished Peoples

ALEKSANDR M. NEKRICH

In late 1943 and early 1944, after the Nazi invasion of Russia had been turned back, Soviet troops descended upon the Caucasus, the Caspian steppes, and the Crimea without warning and brutally deported some one million of their people—Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachai, Kalmyks, and Tatars—to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Siberia. Hundreds were executed and thousands more were to die of malnutrition, exposure, and harsh treatment. Not until the late 1950s were some of them allowed to return to their homelands, but then, and even now, under a burden of lies and guilt for the treasonous acts of a few.

In May 1944, Aleksandr Nekrich was in the Crimea and was a witness to the brutal deportations. Then and later, as one of the most prominent historians in the USSR, he sought answers to the questions surrounding the deportations. Why were these people deported? What was their fate? How did they live in exile? What has happened to them in the ensuing years? Who *did* collaborate with the Nazis? This book, written in the Soviet Union and drawing upon personal interviews as well as documentary evidence, answers these questions while telling the tragic story of the punished peoples.

Until 1976, when he left the USSR, Aleksandr M. Nekrich was a distinguished doctor of historical sciences at the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His book *1941—22 June*, highly critical of the Soviet lack of preparedness for the German invasion, resulted in his fall from favor and ultimately his departure. He is currently a research fellow at the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.

"A valuable and absorbing account. Impressive in scope, careful in documentation, rich in fact, the study incorporates previously unpublished Soviet materials on its subject and is salted with the author's personal memories as a Red Army officer at the time. I hope we shall see the day when the Russian original can be published in Russia itself."

—Robert C. Tucker

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