

able to set on foot, is, notwithstanding, accurate, and should there be the slightest error in the calculation of the above-mentioned troops it is, if anything, in the nature of an overestimate in the actual number. I am certainly not below the number. Supposing then the insurrection keep in its present state, without gaining greater proportions by spreading in the mountains of Circassia, that is to say, from the Black Sea as far as the Caspian, it is incontestable that the Russians would be able, though with difficulty, to bring down fresh troops from the interior of Russia to the seat of war in Asia; but if, on the contrary, the Circassians were to rise in a mass—which may be considered as very probable—the road by Vladi Cavcass thus being closed and guarded by the warlike mountaineers, the Russians in Asia Minor would be cut off from Russia and reduced to fight with their present forces, which must then gradually be exhausted, without the slightest hope for reinforcement, unless it be in very small proportions by the Caspian Sea. For the insurrection in the Caucasus, however, to succeed, it was thought sufficient that Turkey, already mistress of the Black Sea, should seize the opportunity in time, and send immediately to Souk-goum-Kaleh (which has been taken by the squadron of Hassan Pasha,) from 12 to 15 battalions of regular troops and 50,000 rifles, with sufficient ammunition, together with 10 batteries of guns of small size, which might be transported on mules' backs, and this she has done. When the war broke out the Turks were in a really good position, being prepared for the campaign and already masters of the Black Sea; whereas the Russians had not yet finished their preparations for war, nor had yet received the whole of their forces; indeed, 30,000 men have arrived at the seat of war within the last few days from Russia, by the Pass of Vladi Cavcass. But the campaign has been completely muddled by the Turks. Mukhtar Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Anatolia (Asia Minor) insisted on having with him the strongest forces, only thinking of his own army of Erzeroum, the defiles leading to that place, of Kars, and other localities, whereas the real key of the campaign was Batoum. It was clear that the Russians could not undertake long marches into the interior of Asia toward Erzeroum without great difficulty, not having enough beasts for transport, and being without forage for their cavalry if Mukhtar only acted wisely. The first place, therefore, to have been looked to and guarded was Batoum and its defiles, while Mukhtar fought every inch of ground with an active force. Instead of this they have placed as commander of the Batoum Army the Musnir Hassan Tahsin Pasha, whose task is merely to defend the one pass leading to Batoum by the sea-shore. In this he has so far carried out the instructions that up to this he has not allowed himself once to be drawn into a pitched battle in the place, but has succeeded in keeping himself altogether on the defensive—a system of tactics which must, sooner or later, lead to a disaster. Hassan Tahsin Pasha, with an army of only 24,000 men in all, and 20 guns, is at present in front of a strong line of Russians, composed of about 60,000 men, supported by formidable artillery, which the enemy has mobilized before his eyes for the last month, forming a string which extends from Achalalaki to the sea-shore at Tchourouksou. The Turks, in guarding but one of the defiles and leaving the other two—namely, Achalalaki and Achaltzich—completely open, have committed a great error, which may unfortunately decide the campaign in Asia.

The command of Hassan Pasha being limited to Sour-i-Hisir, Batoum, and the environs, Gen. Mukhtar Pasha was the man who ought to have looked after the defense of Achaltzich and Achalalaki, which are the two points leading to Ardahan; but instead of this he placed 13 battalions, about 10,000 men, in the detached forts of Ardahan, forts which only command the openings of the defiles leading to this place, thus leaving aside the narrow defiles themselves, which a handful of determined men must have rendered impregnable for the most formidable army. It so happens that the Russians, acting very naturally under these circumstances, attracted all the attention of the Turks toward Sour-i-Hisir and the plains of Kars, feigning to attack Batoum in the front on one side and the defiles of Erzeroum on the other side, while they passed the defiles of Achalalaki and Achaltzich, crossed the mountains without firing a single shot, and showed themselves very quietly before the Turkish position of Ardahan. Then Hussein Pasha found it prudent to give up the place to the enemy, making but a feeble resistance, and after a battle, which lasted three hours, turning his back on the Russians, taking with him the whole of his army of 13 battalions and his artillery horses, but leaving to the enemy more than 60 guns, which he did not even give himself the trouble to spike, and his magazines of ammunition and provisions. I must not forget to state that his worthy second, Gen. Hassan Pasha, has lately arrived at Batoum from the field with a noble wound in the back of his head. It is said that this wound was given him by a brave young major, who, in despair at seeing himself led in a cowardly way to an unjustifiable retreat, discharged his revolver on his unworthy chief, who was turning his breast in an opposite direction, instead of showing it to the Russians. If the defiles of Achalalaki and Achaltzich had been placed under the command of Hassan Tahsin Pasha, he would have guarded these points as part of the whole line of operations above indicated, completely independent of Kars and Erzeroum. The Russians would not have penetrated as far as Ardahan, thus cutting off all communication between the feeble army of Batoum and Erzeroum, and threatening to fall on Batoum by a flank march; while another force of the Russians would be attacking Hassan Tahsin Pasha in the front at Sour-i-Hisir. The taking of Ardahan has indeed placed our mushir (field marshal) in a very difficult position, he not having a single man of reserve, while the reinforcements so often promised from Constantinople have not yet showed themselves. Nor is Hassan Pasha able to abandon Sour-i-Hisir to come down and help to defend Batoum against the march of the Russians, who are advancing quietly by the valleys which lead from Ardahan, and who will some day walk into Batoum, run their swords through the men forming the garrison of the place, and then, by a combined movement with the troops on the other side of the mountains, take Hassan Tahsin Pasha and all his army in a trap, forcing him to surrender, unless he can manage to get off by the sea in the iron-clads. So much for the consequences to be foreseen of the loss of Ardahan.

The situation of the Turks at present is one of the most critical, and unless a great effort be made to send at least 20,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10 batteries of artillery immediately to Hassan Tahsin Pasha from Constantinople, Batoum, which the Russians are so ambitious to gain, as much for a principal point of strategy as for its commercial value, will in a few days fall into the hands of the enemy. It is quite true that it would have been better if the Russians had taken Batoum directly, without having Ardahan in their possession, because the Turkish fleet, by bombarding it continually, would have made it impossible for them to keep it without being strongly supported in the rear; whereas, being now in possession of Ardahan, the Russians command all this part of the country, and thus create for themselves a new and important basis for military operations, threatening the flank of the army of Erzeroum, and perhaps even Trebizond. Before finishing I must state that, if the Russians were to open out on Batoum to-morrow from the interior, it would be utterly impossible to show them the slightest resistance, as the Turks have not a single intrenchment for protecting their flank and rear, and not a single horse to place before the enemy.

**RUSSIAN ARMY OF THE CAUCASUS.**  
**INFANTRY, CAVALRY, AND ARTILLERY —**  
**GARRISONS TO REPRESS POSSIBLE RE-**  
**VOLTS—THE TURKISH COMMANDER-IN-**  
**CHIEF—HOW ARDAHAN WAS CAPTURED**  
**—THE ADVANCE ON BATOUM.**

*From Our Special Correspondent.*

SOUKGOU-M-KALEH, Tuesday, May 29, 1877.

Sent here from Batoum to take a rapid glance at the situation, I have endeavored to get together what information I could, and now present you with what I believe to be an accurate view of the situation. To begin with the strength of the enemy, the following may be taken as an exact computation of the Czar's strength in this direction. It is gathered from the most accurate and indeed efficient sources, and may be regarded as exact in every particular. At the beginning of the war the Russians had in Asia Minor:

INFANTRY.		Men.
145 Battalions Grenadiers, at 890 men each.		129,050
5 Battalions Chasseurs, at 725 men each.		3,625
16 Battalions line, at 870 men each.		13,920
2 Battalions Cossacks, at 830 men each.		1,660
2 Battalions regular troops, at 670 men each.		1,340
170		
Militians, Georgians, Immirikians, Mingrelians, &c., all Christians.		16,000
Total of Infantry.		165,595
SAPEURS.		
3 Battalions, at 935 men each.		2,805
CAVALRY.		
Cossacks, Dragoons, and Hussars, 173 squadrons, at 120 men each, and as many horses.		20,760
ARTILLERY.		
51 Batteries of eight guns (Krapp). Each battery is composed of six pieces of six centimetres, and two pieces of nine centimetres. Each piece is served by nine men. 408 guns.		3,672
The whole army		192,832
15,000 horses for artillery and train.		

From these troops, which constitute the total of the Army of the Caucasus, Russia was, at the beginning of the war, obliged to subtract the following for garrisons destined to repress any possible revolts on the part of her subjects, viz.:

DAGHESTAN.		Men.
Infantry		15,000
Cavalry		2,000
Artillery (four batteries)		238
TIFLIS.		
Infantry		2,000
Cavalry		120
Artillery (two batteries)		144
SOUKGOU-M-KALEH AND ADJACENT FORTS.		
Infantry		3,000
Cavalry (six squadrons of 120 men each)		720
Artillery (11 mountain pieces)		99
POTI.		
Infantry		200
Artillery		300
ACHALTZICH.		
Infantry		360
Cavalry		120
ACHALALAKI.		
Infantry		230
Cavalry		120
ALEXANDROPOL.		
Infantry		670
Cavalry		120
ERIVAN.		
Infantry		630
Cavalry		120
ELIZABETHPOL.		
Infantry		230
BACCON.		
Infantry		200
To guard the smaller strongholds on the sea-shore and on the Turkish frontiers.		5,000
Total		31,611
Total of effective army		192,832
Different garrisons to be deducted		32,611
Making a grand total of.		161,221

Taking from this total of 161,000 men all those who are employed in the military administration, in the hospitals and infirmaries, &c., we may calculate that the Russians could not dispose of more than 140,000 men as fighting troops against the Ottoman Army. This figure, although not corresponding with the forces of which the Russians boast as being